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Introduction
This thesis is an attempt to contribute to the literature on New-Keynesian Dynamic Sto-
chastic General Equilibrium models - henceforth, NK-DSGE models - with heterogeneous
households. In this respect, the economies are characterized by the presence of savers and
borrowers that interact in the credit market. Borrowers and savers are modeled using a mod-
ified version of the mechanism proposed by Bilbiie, Monacelli and Perotti (2012 - BMP
henceforth). They indeed differ in their degree of impatience: both agents are intertemporal
maximizers - since borrowing and lending take place in equilibrium; and, financial markets
are imperfect. Particularly, we focus on the interaction between fiscal and monetary policy
and their redistributive effects. More in the detail, the thesis is composed of three papers.
The second one profits from the contribution of my supervisor Prof.ssa Lorenza Rossi,
while the first and third papers are not co-authored. The first and the second paper can be
read as separated works, with their rationale and motivations. However, they are part of
a research program and therefore they share a common ground, based on borrowing con-
straints and redistributive issues. While the third paper consists of a Bayesian estimation
of the theoretical model presented in the second paper.
The three papers are structured as follows. In the first paper, we consider a NK-
DSGE model with heterogeneous agents and distortive taxation. Heterogeneous agents are
modeled using a modified version of the mechanism proposed by BMP. In particular, we
introduce government expenditure in the utility function of both agents, and the budget con-
straints are also characterized by distortive taxes. We study the dynamics of the model in
response to: (i) a positive productivity shock; (ii) a positive public expenditure shock; (iii)
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a negative interest rate shock; (iv) a negative saver tax shock and (v) a negative borrower
tax shock (redistributive shocks). We consider these shocks in presence of three different
assumptions on the labor income tax rates of the two agents: a) equal taxes, both agents
face the same labor income tax rate; b) partial redistribution, both agents pay a tax but
the tax rate on borrower labor income is lower than the tax rate on saver labor income; c)
full redistribution, saver labor income is taxed while borrower labor income is subsidized
at the same rate. In the analysis of expansionary fiscal policy, public debt increases more
in a context of partial redistribution than in a context of full redistribution, due to the in-
ternalization of government budget constraint by savers. In addition, a negative saver tax
shock has a negative impact on redistribution, which is exacerbated under partial redistrib-
ution. Finally, a negative borrower tax shock has a negative impact on redistribution when
borrowers receive subsidies, because savers are completely discouraged to save.
In the second paper we consider a NK-DSGE model with distortive taxation and het-
erogeneous agents, modeled using a modified version of the mechanism proposed by BMP.
Following Galì (2014), we study the effects of a shock to government purchases under two
alternative financing regime: (i) monetary financing; (ii) debt financing. Particularly, we fo-
cus on the redistributive effects of the two regimes and we find the following. Both regimes
imply a redistributive effect from savers to borrowers, measured in terms of the ratio be-
tween the consumption of borrower and that of saver. The redistribution is much greater in
the money-financed fiscal stimulus, where the consumption ratio is more than three times
higher than the implied one in the debt-financed fiscal stimulus. Borrowers are better off
also in terms of their relative labor supply. Finally, with respect to the representative agent
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model, the presence of borrowers enhances the impact of the fiscal intervention on aggre-
gate output, when spending is debt financed. Remarkbly, with respect to Galì (2014), the
same regime implies a reduction of the debt burden instead of an increase.
The third paper is a Bayesian estimation of the model presented in the second paper
with heterogeneous agents and a debt-financed fiscal stimulus. We estimate the model using
US data, we choose five series (output, consumption, real wage, hours and policy rate) for
the period 1966Q1-2004Q4 and five shocks. We consider the economy to be affected by a
government spending shock, together with four other shocks: a TFP shock, a labor supply
shock, a price markup shock and a preference shock, which are quite standard. Our results
convey a key message: a debt-financed fiscal stimulus played no role in determining the US
area business cycle (see also, Albonico, Paccagnini and Tirelli (2016)). Another important
result is the main role played by productivity and mark-up shocks, as the most important
drivers of borrower consumption and output. The preference shock adds to these two ones
in explaining the volatility of savers’ consumption.
Redistribution has been largely overlooked in the literature on DSGE models, which
has been mostly based on the paradigm of a representative-agent economy with perfect fi-
nancial market. At the heart of macroeconomic literature dealing with monetary policy
issues lies some form of “aggregate Euler equation” or “IS” curve: an inverse relationship
between aggregate consumption today and the expected real interest rate. This relationship
is derived from the households’ individual Euler equation assuming that all households
substitute consumption intertemporally – for example using assets. Normative prescrip-
tions are then derived by using this equation as a building block. But direct data on asset
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holdings show that a low fraction of US population holds assets in various form. Hence,
models incorporating this insight have been recently used in the macroeconomic litera-
ture. They show that the presence of liquidity constrained consumers alters the standard
results on the dynamics of the NK-DSGE models. Mankiw (2000) has introduced a frac-
tion of agents which does not hold physical capital. Galì et al. (2007) have extended this
insight for fiscal policy issues. Rule of thumb behavior results from consumers who face
binding borrowing constraints. They demonstrate that the presence of liquidity constrained
consumers can explain consumption crowding in, which follows an increase in govern-
ment spending. Bilbiie (2008) shows that limited asset market participation can lead to
an inverted aggregate demand logic (the IS curve has a positive slope). Di Bartolomeo
and Rossi (2007) show that the effectiveness of monetary policy increases as limited as-
set market participation becomes more important. Galì et al. (2004) study the determinacy
properties in a model with limited asset market participation and capital accumulation un-
der different Taylor rules, showing that the presence of liquidity constrained consumers
may alter the determinacy properties of a standard NK model. However, none of these pa-
pers compares a money-financed fiscal stimulus with a debt-financed fiscal stimulus. Also
they do not consider the dynamic effects of fiscal rules in the presence of public debt and
borrowing-constrained agents. Households heterogeneity explains also the rapid increase
in gross household debt in a number of countries in the years leading up to the 2008 crisis.
This debt set the stage for the crisis, and the overhang of debt continues to act as a drag on
recovery. Debt is also invoked as a reason to dismiss calls for expansionary fiscal policy as
a response to unemployment: you cannot solve a problem created by debt running up even
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more debt. Given the prominence of debt in popular discussion of our current economic
difficulties and the long tradition of invoking debt as a key factor in major economic con-
tractions, one might have expected debt at the heart of most mainstream macroeconomic
models - especially the analysis of monetary and fiscal policy. Perhaps somewhat surpris-
ingly, however, it is quite common to abstract altogether from debt issue. One exception is
represented by BMP which analyze the effects of two types of fiscal policy rules in a model
where a fraction of households are borrowing-constrained. However, this paper does not
investigate the role played by distorsive labor income tax rules, and does not analyze the
effects of a government spending financed through seigniorage. In the Eurozone, avoiding
monetary finance of public debt was the absolute core of inherited Bundesbank philoso-
phy. This is the reason why the pre-crisis dominant tool has always been represented by
the policy rate. It could influence the price of credit, or in other words the price of money.
The channel to influence the price of credit was generally considered indirect by passing
through the movements of the policy rate. And, no role was expected by fiscal policies.
One reason for the lack of interest was the general belief that the lags in implementing fis-
cal policies were typically too long to be useful for combating recessions. However, this
long period of crisis has opened a wide spectrum of policy tools because interest rates have
already been reduced close to zero bounds. Nowadays, many money creation policies are
considered. The extreme end of this spectrum of possible tools is represented by the overt
money finance of fiscal deficit - "helicopter money", permanent monetization of govern-
ment debt. But a more moderate example of money creation has already been implemented
by central banks: quantitative easing operation. However, Giavazzi and Tabellini (2014)
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argue that measures as quantitative easing should take place, but together with fiscal eas-
ing. Combining a monetary and fiscal expansion is the key for the success of aggregate
demand management, as shown in the recent experience of other advanced countries. Fis-
cal policy can be an effective tool of demand management in circumstances when interest
rates are at the zero bound. But, fiscal expansion without monetary easing would be almost
impossible, because of public debt in circulation is already too high in many countries. The
main objection to the combined monetary and fiscal stimulus is not economic, but political.
It would be opposed by Germany, and perhaps a few other member states, because it runs
counter to the principle of monetary and fiscal separation of the Treaty. The academic lit-
erature has reacted with a renewed interest in monetary and fiscal policy interactions (See
Woodford (2011) and Kirsanova et al. (2009)). Ascari and Rankin (2013) have analyzed
the potentially drastic effect of a Taylor Rule on the effectiveness of fiscal policy in a non-
Ricardian model with overlapping generations. However, they do not analyze the effects
of distortive labor income taxes and they do not consider monetary policies alternative to
the standard Taylor-type rules. In this scenario, Galì (2014) has analyzed the effects of an
alternative and not conventional monetary policy to recover the economy: a fiscal stimu-
lus, in the form of temporary increase in government purchases, financed entirely through
money creation. However, Galì (2014) does not consider the redistributive effects of this
policy which is instead the main objective of our thesis. Finally, this literature considers
lump-sum taxes and the distortive effect of the labor income tax rules is not taken into
account.
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Heterogeneous Households and
Debt Dynamics
Chiara Punzo, Ph.D. Studenty
Abstract
We consider a NK-DSGE model with distortive taxation and
heterogeneous agents, modeled using a modied version of the
mechanism proposed by Bilbiie, Monacellli and Perotti (2012).
We study the dynamics of the model in response to ve shocks,
under three di¤erent assumptions on the labor income tax rates:
a) equal taxes, both agents face the same labor income tax rate;
b) partial redistribution, both agents pay a tax but the tax rate
on borrower labor income is lower than the tax rate on saver labor
income; c) full redistribution, saver labor income is taxed while
borrower labor income is subsidized at the same rate. In the
analysis of expansionary scal policy, public debt increases more
in a context of partial redistribution than in a context of full
redistribution, due to the internalization of government budget
constraint by savers. In addition, a negative saver tax shock has
a negative impact on redistribution, which is exacerbated under
partial redistribution. Finally, a negative borrower tax shock
has a negative impact on redistribution when borrowers receive
subsidies, because savers are completely discouraged to save.
1 Introduction
This paper contributes to the literature on heterogeneous agents. While
this literature has concentrated on the preferences of agents for con-
sumption and labor, it abstracts from the role played by the presence of
public expenditure in utility function. Furthermore, most of the papers
Preliminary Draft (Not Be Quoted)
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with scal stimula consider lump-sum taxes and do not analyze the in-
teraction between distortive taxes and scal stimula. This paper tries to
ll this gap, by considering a New-Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic Gen-
eral Equilibrium model - henceforth, NK-DSGE model - characterized
by heterogeneous agents and distortive taxation, together with imper-
fect competitive rms and sticky prices. In this respect, the economies
are characterized by the presence of savers and borrowers that inter-
act in the credit market and given intrinsic characteristics of the model
economy this gives rise to dynamics which are inuenced by the balance
sheet of agents and feed back to the rest of the economy. Heterogeneous
agents di¤er in their degree of impatience: both agents are intertemporal
maximizers - s.t. borrowing and lending take place in equilibrium; and,
nancial markets are imperfect. Heterogeneous agents are modeled us-
ing a modied version of the mechanism proposed by Bilbiie, Monacelli
and Perotti (2013). In particular, we introduce government expenditure
in the utility function of both agents, and the budget constraints are
also characterized by distortive taxes.
In this context, we study the dynamics of the model in response to:
(i) a positive productivity shock; (ii) a positive public expenditure shock;
(iii) a negative interest rate shock; (iv) a negative saver tax shock and
(v) a negative borrower tax shock. We consider these shocks in presence
of three di¤erent steady-state levels of exogenous taxes: a) equal taxes,
tax rates on both labor incomes are equal; b) partial redistribution, both
agents pay a tax but the tax rate on borrower labor income is lower
than the tax rate on saver labor income; c) full redistribution, borrowers
receive a subsidy proportional to their labor incomes and savers pay a
tax. The main results of the paper can be summarized as follows.
In this model, although aggregate wealth is mainly in the hands of the
rich, poor agents have a large inuence on aggregate consumption. Thus,
in the aggregate, we observe a signicant departure from permanent in-
come behavior, in contrast to standard representative-agent models. In
this paper we show how the presence of impatient consumers may alter
dramatically the consequences of stimulus programmes, particularly in
light of the upward trajectory of public debt and distortive taxes, and
overturn some of the conventional results found in the literature. The
assumption that government bonds are perceived as net wealth by the
private sector plays an important role in theoretical analyses of mone-
tary and scal e¤ects. For example, in response to a negative saver tax
shock, savers choose to work less when borrowers pay taxes, while they
choose to work more when borrowers receive a subsidy, in steady state.
Why? Because there is a strong incentive for savers to internalize the
government budget constraint through their public debt holdings and so
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recognize that a lower saver tax today implies an higher tax on them-
selves, today or in the future. On the other side, borrowers in any case
decide to work more, because they internalize the government budget
constraint due to distortive taxation on labor income. This is the rea-
son why they also decrease their consumption. But borrowers reaction
depends also on saver impulse responses. When savers work less, bor-
rowers decide to work more and consume less. When savers work more,
viceversa. Saver consumption, instead, always increases but proportion-
ally to saver labor supply. Hence, there is an expansion when borrowers
receive subsidies, otherwise economy is stabilized. The sticky price en-
vironment explains why labor demand increases when borrowers receive
subsidies in steady state, while it decreases when borrowers pay taxes.
Remember that savers are the owners of rms. And, it explains also the
corresponding e¤ects on ination. Nominal interest rate uctuations are
explained by a standard Taylor rule. And, nally, public debt depends
on distortive taxation on labor incomes. When savers work less, public
debt increases more.
We wanted also to compare the equilibrium dynamics concerning the
ratio between borrower consumption and saver consumption (and their
relative wealth) under the di¤erent scal and monetary policies. A posi-
tive public expenditure shock and a negative interest rate shock increase
borrowersconsumption more than saversone. On the other side, a neg-
ative saver tax shock increases saver consumption more than borrower
one but the e¤ect in the event of partial redistribution is enormously
greater than other cases. Finally, the IRFs in the event of a negative
borrower tax shock are very di¤erent. In the case borrowers pay taxes,
a borrower tax shock increases borrower consumption more than savers
one. When borrowers receive a subsidy, a borrower tax shock increases
saver consumption more than borrowers one.
New Keynesian (NK) models of last generation, featuring imperfect
competition, and price stickiness as central building blocks, have recently
become a workhorse reference for the analysis of monetary policy (Clar-
ida, Galì and Gertler, 1999). Surprisingly, most of these models have
largely ignored the interaction between heterogeneous agents and the
role of government and Central Bank. Redistribution has been largely
overlooked in the recent literature, which has been mostly based on
the paradigm of a representative-agent economy with perfect nancial
market. At the heart of modern macroeconomic literature dealing with
monetary policy issues lies some form of "aggregate Euler equation" or
"IS" curve: an inverse relationship between aggregate consumption to-
day and the expected real interest rate. This relationship is derived from
the householdsindividual Euler equation assuming that all households
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substitute consumption intertemporally - for example using assets. Nor-
mative prescriptions are then derived by using this equation as a building
block. Direct data on asset holdings show that a low fraction of US pop-
ulation holds assets in various forms. Models incorporating this insight
have been recently used in the macroeconomic literature. Some version
of this assumption - whereby a fraction of agents does not hold physical
capital - has been proposed by Mankiw (2000) and extended by Gali
et al. (2007) for scal policy issues. Both the Barro-Ramsey model
(Barro, 1974) and the Diamond- Samuelson model (Diamond, 1965) as-
sume that all households use nancial markets to smooth consumption
over time. But neither the Barro-Ramsey nor the Diamond-Samuelson
model is adequate for analyzing scal policy. Consumption smoothing
is far from perfect. One can view the rule-of-thumb behavior as re-
sulting from consumers who face binding borrowing constraints. Of the
consumers who participated in Federal Reserve Boards 1983 Survey of
Consumers Finances, 43 said that being prepared for emergencies was
the most important reason for saving. Only 15 percent said that prepar-
ing for retirement was the most important saving motive. These are not
the answers that standard interpretations of the Life Cycle/Permanent
Income Hypothesis (LC/PIH) model of saving would lead one to expect.
Carroll (1997), however, argues that such responses, and a wide range
of other evidence, are consistent with a version of the LC/PIH model in
which consumers face important income uncertainty, but are also "pru-
dent" in sense that have a precautionary saving motive, and "impatient"
in the sense that if future income were known with certainty they would
choose to consume more than their current income. Under these condi-
tions, consumers may engage in what Carroll calls "bu¤er-stock" saving
behavior. In addition, Mankiw argues that many people have net worth
near zero and bequests are an important factor in wealth accumulation.
During this period of Great Recession, one of the most important
political debates concerns with the e¤ects of so-called scal and mone-
tary stimulus programmes. And, if there is a single word that appears
most frequently in discussion of the economic problems now a­ icting
United States and Europe, that word is surely debt. It is important
to understand the distributional consequences of stimulus programmes,
particularly in light of the upward trajectory of public debt. There was
a rapid increase in gross household debt in a number of countries in the
years leading up to the 2008 crisis. This debt, it is widely argued, set the
stage for the crisis, and the overhang of debt continues to act as a drag
on recovery. Debt is also invoked - wrongly, Krugman and Eggertsson
(2012) argue - as a reason to dismiss calls for expansionary scal policy
as a response to unemployment: you cannot solve a problem created by
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debt running up even more debt, say the critics. The current preoccu-
pation with debt harks back to a long tradition in economic analysis.
And, given the prominence of debt in popular discussion of our current
economic di¢ culties and the long tradition of invoking debt as a key
factor in major economic contractions, one might have expected debt at
the hearth of most mainstream macroeconomic models - especially the
analysis of monetary and scal policy. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly,
however, it is quite common to abstract altogether from this feature of
the economy.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Next section in-
troduces the model, while Section 3 presents the di¤erent policy regimes
and analyzes the steady states and model dynamics. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a New-Keynesian model with imperfectly competitive goods
markets and sticky prices. A closed production economy is populated
by a continuum of monopolistically competitive producers and a con-
tinuum of households [0,1] all having the same utility function deriving
from consumption goods, government expenditure and leisure. Each rm
produces a di¤erentiated good by using as input the labor services sup-
plied by the household in a perfectly competitive labor market. Prices
of consumption goods are assumed to be sticky à la Rotemberg (1982).
There are two Policymakers. We assume that the monetary authority
decides on the nominal interest rate as in the cashless limit economy.
The scal authority is responsible for choosing the level of government
expenditure, levying distortive taxes on labor income and issuing one-
period nominal non state-contingent government debt. By no arbitrage,
the interest rate on bonds has to equalize the monetary policy rate in
equilibrium. Finally, we assume that the central bank and the scal
authority are fully independent, i.e. they do not act cooperatively and
they do not share a budget constraint.
This section briey describes our economy and denes competitive
equilibria.
2.1 Households
All households have preferences dened over private consumption, C;t;
public expenditure, Gt; and labor services, N;t;according to the following
utility function:
U0 = E0
1X
t=0
t
"
(1  ) lnC;t +  lnGt    
N1+';t
1 + '
#
; (1)
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where ' is the inverse of the labour supply elasticity. The agents
di¤er in their discount factors  2 (0; 1) and possibly in their prefer-
ence for leisure  :Specically, we assume that there are two types of
agents  = s; b; and s > b: E0 denotes expectations conditional on
the information available at time 0 and  measures the weight of public
spending relatively to private consumption. Also, as we show below, 
determines the share of government expenditure over GDP, computed at
the non-stochastic steady state of the Pareto e¢ cient equilibrium. C;t is
a CES aggregator of the quantity consumed Ct(z) of any of the innitely
many varieties z 2 [0; 1] and it is dened as
C;t =
Z 1
0
Ct(z)
 1
 dz
 
 1
; (2)
 > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between varieties.
A 1  share is represented by households who are patient: we label
them savers, discounting the future at s:Consistent with the equilibrium
outcome the patient agents are savers (and hence will hold the bonds
issued by impatient agents), we impose that patient agents also hold all
the shares in rms.
In each period t  0 and under all contingencies each saver chooses
consumption, hours worked and asset holdings (bonds and shares), sub-
ject to:
Cs;t +Bs;t+1 + As;t+1 + 
s;t+1Vt 1 + it 1
t
Bs;t +
1 + it 1
t
As;t (3)
+
s;t(Vt +  t) + wtNs;t(1   s;t);
where wt is the real wage, As;t is the real value at beginning of pe-
riod t of total private assets held in period t (t = Pt=Pt 1 is the net
ination rate), a portfolio of one-period bonds issued in t-1 on which the
household receives the nominal interest it 1:Vt is the real market value at
time t of shares in intermediate good rms,  t are real dividend payo¤s
of these shares, 
s;t are share holdings,wtNs;t(1    s;t) is the after-tax
real saver labor income, and Bs;t are the savers holdings of nominal
public bonds which deliver the same nominal interest as private bonds.
The nominal debt Bt pays one unit in nominal terms in period t+1. To
prevent Ponzi games, the following condition is assumed to hold at all
dates and under all contingencies
lim
T!1
Et
(
TY
k=0
(1 + it+k)
 1Bs;t+T
)
 0: (4)
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Given prices, policies and transfers fPt(z); wt; it; Gt;  s;t; Vt; t; Ttgt0
and the initial condition B 1, the saver chooses the set of processes
fCs;t(z); Cs;t; Ns;t; Bs;t;
s;t; As;tgt0 ;so as to maximize (1) subject to (2)
- (4). After dening the aggregate price level as:
Pt =
Z 1
0
Pt(z)
1 dz
 1
1 
; (5)
as well as real debt as, bt  Bt=Pt; optimality is characterized by the
standard rst-order conditions:
Cs;t(z) =

Pt (z)
Pt
 
Cs; (6)
sEt

Cs;t (1 + it)
Cs;t+1t+1

= 1; (7)
sEt

Cs;t
Cs;t+1
Vt+1 +  t+1
Vt

= 1; (8)
 sN
'
s;tCs;t
1   = wt(1   s;t); (9)
together with transversality:
lim
T!1
Et

T
bs;t+T
Cs;t+T

= 0: (10)
Equation 9 shows that the labor income tax drives a wedge between
the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption and
the real wage.
In each period t  0 and under all contingencies the rest of the
households on the [0, ]interval are impatient (and will borrow in equi-
librium, hence we index them by b for borrowers) faces the following
budget constraint:
Cb;t + Ab;t+1  1 + it 1
t
Ab;t + wtNb;t(1   b;t); (11)
as well as the additional borrowing constraint (on borrowing in real
terms) at all times t:
 Ab;t+1  D: (12)
Given prices, policies and transfers fPt(z); wt; t; it; Gt;  b;t; Ttgt0,
the borrower chooses the set of processes fCb;t(z); Cb;t; Nb;t; Ab;tgt0 ; so
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as to maximize (1) subject to (2) and (11). Optimality is characterized
by the standard rst-order conditions:
Cb;t(z) =

Pt (z)
Pt
 
Cb; (13)
C 1b;t = bEt

(1 + it)
t+1
C 1b;t+1

+ t; (14)
 bN
'
b;tCb;t
1   = wt(1   b;t): (15)
Equation (15) shows that the labor income tax drives a wedge be-
tween the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption
and the real wage. While, in (14), t takes a positive value whenever the
constraint is binding. Indeed, because of our assumption on the relative
size of the discount factors, the borrowing constraint will bind in steady
state.
2.2 Firms
There are innitely many rms indexed by z on the unit interval [0,1]
and each of them produces a di¤erentiated variety with a constant return
to scale technology
Yt(z) = xtNt(z); (16)
where productivity xtis identical across rms and Nt(z) denotes the
quantity of labor hired by rm z in period t. Following Rotemberg(1982),
we assume that rms face quadratic price adjustment costs:

2

Pt(z)
Pt 1(z)
  1
2
(17)
expressed in the units of the consumption good dened in (2) and
  0:Nominal prots read as:
Et
( 1X
i=0
Qt;t+i
"
Pt+i(z)Yt+i(z) Wt+iNt+i(z)
 Pt+i 2

Pt+i(z)
Pt+i 1(z)
  1
2 #) ; (18)
where Qt;t+iis the discount factor in period t for nominal prots i
periods ahead.
Assuming that rms discount at the same rate as savers implies
Qt;t+i = 
i
s
Cs;t
Cs;t+it+i
: (19)
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Each rm faces the following demand function:
Yt(z) =

Pt(z)
Pt
 
Y dt ; (20)
where Y dt is aggregate demand and it is taken as given by any rm
z.
Cost minimization taking the wage as given implies that real marginal
cost is wt:Firms choose processes fPt(z); Nb;t(z); Ns;t(z); Yt(z)gt0so as
to maximize(18) subject to (16) and(20), taking as aggregate prices and
quantities

Pt;Wt; Y
d
t
	
t0 :Let the real marginal cost be denoted by
mct = wt=xt (21)
Then, at a symmetric equilibriumwhere Pt(z) = Pt for all z 2 [0; 1];prot
maximization and the denition of the discount factor imply:
t(t   1) = sEt

Cs;t
Cs;t+1
t+1(t+1   1)

+
xtNt


mct     1


(22)
(22)is the standard Phillips curve according to which current ination
depends positively on future ination and current marginal cost.
The prot function in real terms is given by
 t(z) =

Pt (z)
Pt

Yt(z)  wtNt(z)  
2

Pt(z)
Pt 1(z)
  1
2
(23)
which aggregated over rms gives total prots
 t(z) = (1 mct)Yt   
2
(t   1)2 : (24)
2.3 Policymakers
In the economy there are two benevolent policy makers. A monetary
authority is responsible for setting the nominal interest rate it in re-
sponse to uctuations in interest rate, output and ination (we assume
for simplicity that target ination is one).
ln {^t = r ln {^t 1 + (1  r)

y ln Y^t +  ln ^t

(25)
The scal authority provides the public good Gt(z) for any z 2
[0; 1]and aggregating them according to:
Gt =
Z 1
0
Gt(z)
 1
 dz
 
 1
(26)
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so that total government expenditure in nominal terms is PtGtand
the public demand of any variety is:
Gt(z) =

Pt(z)
Pt
 
Gt
Expenditures are nanced by levying a distortive labor income tax
on savers  s;t and on borrowers  b;t or by issuing one period, risk-free,
non state contingent nominal bonds Bs;t, which are held only by the
savers. Hence, the budget constraint of the government is:
Bs;t+1 + (1  ) s;tWtNs;t +  b;tWtNb;t = 1 + it 1
t
Bs;t +GtPt (27)
where  t are total tax revenues, that is,  t =  b;t + (1  )  s;t:
Therefore, the central bank and the scal authority determine the
sequence fit; Gt;  b;t;  s;tgt0 that, at the equilibrium prices, uniquely
determines the sequencefBs;tgt0 via (27). For what follows, the govern-
ment budget constraint can be written in real terms
bs;t+1 + (1  ) s;tmctxtNs;t +  b;tmctxtNb;t = 1 + it 1
t
bs;t +Gt (28)
after substituting for wtfrom the expression for the real marginal
cost.
2.4 Competitive Equilibrium with constant taxes
We take as benchmark the case of competitive equilibrium with con-
stant taxes. Our benchmark economy features three distortions: a) im-
perfect competition in the goods market; b) price-adjustment costs; c)
distortive taxation. In an equilibrium of this economy, all agents take
as given prices, as well as the evolution of exogenous processes. Specif-
ically, labour market clearing requires that labour demand equal total
labor supply,
Nt = Nb;t + (1  )Ns;t: (29)
Private debt is in zero net supply
R 1
0
A;t+1 = 0; and hence, since
agents of a certain type make symmetric decisions:
Ab;t+1 + (1  )As;t+1 = 0 (30)
Equity market clearing implies that share holdings of each saver are
10

s;t+1 = 
s;t = 
 =
1
1   (31)
Finally, by WalrasLaw the goods market also clears. At a symmet-
ric equilibrium where Pt(z) = Pt for all z [0; 1]; Yt(z) = Y dt and the
feasibility constraint is:
xtNt = Ct +Gt +

2
(t   1)2 (32)
where
Ct = Cb;t + (1  )Cs;t (33)
All bonds issued by the government will be held by savers. Market
clearing for public debt implies:
(1  )Bs;t+1 = Bt+1 (34)
In our equilibrium, productivity, public expenditure, interest rate,
borrower tax and saver tax are stochastic and evolve according to the
following process
ln x^t = x ln x^t 1 + 
x
t (35)
ln G^t = g ln G^t 1 + 
g
t (36)
ln {^t = r ln {^t 1 + (1  r)

y ln Y^t +  ln ^t

+ ln ^mt (37)
where
ln ^mt = r ln ^
m
t 1   umt (38)
ln ^ b;t = b ln ^ b;t 1   bt (39)
ln ^ s;t = s ln ^ s;t 1   st (40)
where x, g; m; b and s are i.i.d. shocks and x, g; r; b and s
are autoregressive coe¢ cients.
We dene the notion of competitive equilibrium as in Barro (1979)
and Lucas and Stokey (1983), where decisions of the private sector
and policies are described by collections of rules mapping the history
of exogenous events into outcomes, given the initial state. Let st =
11
Summary of the model
Budget constraint, S Cs;t + bs;t+1 + As;t+1 + 
s;t+1Vt =
1+it 1
t
bs;t +
1+it 1
t
As;t
+
s;t(Vt +  t) + wtNs;t(1   s;t)
Euler equation for bond, S C 1s;t = s
h
C 1s;t+1
1+it
t+1
i
Euler equation for share holdings, S C 1s;t Vt = s

C 1s;t+1(Vt+1 +  t+1)

Labour supply, S
 sN
'
s;tCs;t
1  = wt(1   s;t)
Borrowing constraint, B  Ab;t+1 = D
Euler equation for bond, B C 1b;t = bEt
h
1+it
t+1
C 1b;t+1
i
+ t
Labour supply, B
 bN
'
b;tCb;t
1  = wt(1   b;t)
Production function Yt = xtNt
Phillips curve t(t   1) = sEt
h
Cs;t
Cs;t+1
t+1(t+1   1)
i
+ xtNt

 
mct    1

Aggregated real prots  t = Yt   wtNt   2 (t   1)2
Government budget constraint bs;t+1 + (1  ) s;tmctxtNs;t
+ b;tmctxtNb;t =
1+it 1
t
bs;t +Gt
Resource constraint Yt = Ct +Gt +

2
(t   1)2
Productivity process ln x^t = x ln x^t 1 + 
x
t
Public expenditure process ln G^t = g ln G^t 1 + 
g
t
Interest rate process ln ^mt = r ln ^
m
t 1   umt
Private Debt Market Clearing Ab;t+1 + (1  )As;t+1 = 0
Labour Demand mct = wt=xt
Aggregate labor input Nt = Nb;t + (1  )Ns;t
Aggregate consumption Ct = Cb;t + (1  )Cs;t
Taylor rule ln {^t = r ln {^t 1 + (1  r)

y ln Y^t +  ln ^t

Borrower tax process ln ^ b;t = b ln ^ b;t 1   bt
Saver tax process ln ^ s;t = s ln ^ s;t 1   st
Table 1: Summary of the Model
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(x0; :::; xt;G0:::Gt; i0:::it;  b;0::: b;t;  s;0::: s;t)be the history of the exoge-
nous events.
Given a particular history st, the endogenous state bs;t 1;and
jt = (Cb;t;Cs;t; Ct; Ab;t; As;t; t; Nb;t; Ns;t; Nt; Yt; bt; wt;mct; Vt; t; t);
jr(s
rjst; bs;t 1) denotes the rules describing current and future decisions
for any possible history sr; r  t; t  0:Finally, we can dene a continua-
tion competitive equilibrium as a set of sequences t = fjrgrtsatisfying
equations (3), (7)-(10), (12), (14)-(16), (21)-(22), (24)-(25), (28)-(30)and
(32)-(33) for any sr:Obviously, a competitive equilibrium 0is simply a
continuation competitive equilibrium starting at s0;given bs; 1:
3 Calibration
In this section we analyze di¤erent policy regimes. First, we will analyze
as benchmark the Competitive problem with constant taxes presented
before. We consider three steady-state levels of taxes. In the rst steady-
state, taxes on both agents are equal. The second steady state features a
redistribution where both agents pay a tax but borrower tax is lower than
saver tax. The third steady state features a full redistribution where
borrowers receive a subsidy while savers pay a tax, both proportional to
worked hours and wages.
Then, a di¤erent policy regime will be presented: the Competitive
equilibrium with scal rule. The plan prescribes a tax path that depends
on public debt. We think that this is an interesting case, even though it is
a simple one, because an endogenous tax response to public debt roughly
agrees with the intentions declared by most of public debt-targeting
governments. We keep all our previous assumptions.
The deep parameters of the model are set according to Table (2).
The weight  in the utility function has been chosen to roughly match
U.S.
post-war government spending-to-GDP ratio. We set the serial cor-
relation of the shocks equal to 0.9, except for the interest rate shock
where we set it equal to 0.5. After substituting the aggregate produc-
tion function Yt = xtNt, the log-linearized Phillips curve (22) reads as
follow:
^t =
   1
2   1s(C^t   C^t 1) + sEt^t+1 +
"Y mc
 (2   1)m^ct + (41)
"Y
 (2   1)

mc  "  1
"

Y^t
where a circumex denotes log-deviations from steady state, vari-
ables without a time subscript denote steady-state values. The e¤ect of
13
Description Parameter Value Source
Savers discount factor s 0.99 Bilbiie, Monacelli and Perotti (2013)
and Gnocchi and Lambertini (2014)
Borrowers discount factor b 0.95 Bilbiie, Monacelli and Perotti (2013)
Weight of G in utility  0.15 Gnocchi and Lambertini (2014)
Weight of C in utility 1   0.85 Gnocchi and Lambertini (2014)
Savers preference for leisure  s 0.3
Borrowers preference for leisure  b 0.6
Elast. subst. goods  6 Galì et al. (2004)
Calvo Parameter  0.75
Frisch elasticity ' 1 1 Gnocchi and Lambertini (2014)
Borrowing constraint D 0.5 Bilbiie, Monacelli and Perotti (2013)
Share of impatient household  0.35 Bilbiie, Monacelli and Perotti (2013)
Serial corr. tech. x 0.9
Serial corr. public expenditure G 0.9
Serial corr. interest rate r 0.5
Output coe¢ cient y 0.125
Ination coe¢ cient  1.5
Interest rate coe¢ cient r 0.8
Serial corr. borrower tax b 0.09
Serial corr. saver tax s 0.09
Table 2: Benchmark Calibration
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Variable Symbol No Red. Red. Full Red.
Borrowers consumption Cb 0.7751 0.8281 1.5013
Savers consumption Cs 1.2491 1.0191 0.9031
Aggregate consumption C 1.0832 0.9523 1.1125
Borrowers hours worked Nb 1.0661 0.9979 1.1795
Savers hours worked Ns 1.3232 1.1584 1.3072
Aggregate worked hours N 1.2332 1.1023 1.2625
Real debt b 15.6719 24.855 3.1701
Real market value of shares V 20.3479 18.1872 20.8313
Real dividend payo¤s of shares   0.2055 0.1837 0.2104
Table 3: Steady State
variations in the marginal cost on current ination depends on the pa-
rameters  and " but also on steady-state output and ination. Around
a zero net ination steady state, equation (41) boils down to:
^t = sEt^t+1 +
("  1)Y

m^ct (42)
taking the same form as in the Calvo model. Hence, we can establish
a mapping between our parametrization and average price duration. We
set parameter
 =

(1  )(1  )Y
where  = 0:75, for our benchmark calibration, which implies a price
duration of roughly two quarters.
3.1 Steady States
We now set xt = 1, Gt = 0:15 for all t and analyze the non-stochastic
steady state of the competitive equilibrium. We focus on a deterministic
steady state where ination is one. As the constraint binds in steady
state ( = C 1b [1  (b=s)] > 0 whenever s > b), patient agents
are net borrowers and steady-state private debt is Ab =   D; by debt
market clearing, then the patient agents are net lenders and their pri-
vate bond holdings are As =  D= (1  ) :We consider three steady-state
levels of taxes. In the rst steady-state:  b =  s = 0:3:The values of
the macroeconomic variables of interest are reported in the third col-
umn of Table(3). In words, public liabilities must be 15 times GDP
to be su¢ ciently high to nance government spending. The assump-
tion of commitment to repay on the side of public agents may appear
unrealistic with such high level of indebtedness. But we consider the
15
competitive steady state with no redistribution as a theoretical bench-
mark and maintain the assumption that all debts are repaid - private or
public.
The second steady state features a redistribution where  s >  b > 0:
In the third steady-state borrowers receive a subsidy while savers pay a
tax, both proportional to worked hours and wages. These two steady
state are summarized in the fourth and fth column of Table (3). In the
economy with  s >  b > 0 the public debt is 23 times GDP at the steady
state and hours worked, prots, and consequently the value of shares,
are well below the rst case. Aggregate consumption, and in particular
saversconsumption, decreases. Only borrowersconsumption increases.
The economy with  s > 0 and  b < 0 has a steady state public debt
of 2.5%, which implies higher hours, output, prots, value of share as
well as aggregate consumption, in particular borrowers consumption,
relative to the economy with  s >  b > 0: The cost of this economic
expansion is paid by saversconsumption.
3.2 Analysis of equilibrium dynamics
To illustrate how taxes a¤ect stimulus programmes, we analyze the dy-
namic responses of the economy starting at the three steady states spec-
ied in Table (3). Consider rst the case of a technological shock.
Figure (1) presents the impulse responses of our key variables to a pos-
itive technological shock. We x the size of the shocks to 0.01. In
response to a positive technological shock, the impulse responses of the
economies starting at three di¤erent initial conditions are similar but,
in some cases, also proportional to the size of the gap between the lev-
els of taxes. The reduction on labor supply by the savers more than
compensates the increase in labor supply by the borrowers, leading to
an overall contraction in spending and output. But an interest rate rule
that satises the Taylor principle will generate lower nominal interest
rates along the adjustment path, and hence, will call for a higher level
of consumption for savers. Two elements are typical of the sticky-price
environment. First, as rms cannot optimally adjust prices, the reduc-
tion in consumption ensuing from the productivity shock generates a
decrease in labor demand. Second, the decrease in the real wage that
results from the reduction in labor demand generates, for one, a further
income e¤ect on borrowers and hence a further reduction in their con-
sumption; it also results in a rise in prots, with an additional negative
income e¤ect on the savers labor supply. Public debt increase results
from lower public revenues. Hence, a positive technological shock gen-
erates paradoxical results: an increase in productivity is contractional.
16
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Figure 1: IRFs Productivity shock - Constant taxes
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Figure 2: IRFs Public expenditure shock - Constant taxes
The key extra element is that these contradicting forces depend on the
share of borrowers. The results for an alternative share associated to
the technological shock in the Competitive problem with constant taxes
are reported in Appendix to demonstrate the importance of borrowers
share on economic activity.
Public expenditure shock alters these ndings. The impulse re-
sponses to a positive public expenditure shock are reported in
Figure(2); the magnitude of the shock is the same as in the produc-
tivity shock. In response to a positive public expenditure shock, savers
choose to work more but the intensity of the income e¤ect on labor sup-
ply varies with the size of the gap between the levels of taxes. On the
other side, borrowers choose to work more when taxes are uniform but
they choose to work less when they receive a subsidy. In any case, the
income e¤ect on saverslabor supply prevails over the income e¤ect on
borrowerslabor supply, leading to an overall expansion in spending and
output proportional to the size of the gap between the levels of taxes.
But an interest rate rule that satises the Taylor principle will gener-
ate higher nominal interest rates along the adjustment path, and hence,
will call for a lower level of consumption for savers. As rms cannot
18
0 10 20
-0.1
0
0.1
Cb
0 10 20
-0.01
0
0.01
Cs
0 10 20
-0.05
0
0.05
N
0 10 20
-0.02
0
0.02
Nb
0 10 20
-0.1
0
0.1
Ns
0 10 20
-0.05
0
0.05
Y
0 10 20
-0.1
-0.05
0
Interest rate
0 10 20
-0.5
0
0.5
Profits
0 10 20
-0.1
-0.05
0
Inflation
0 10 20
-0.05
0
0.05
b
0 10 20
-0.1
0
0.1
w
Equal taxes
Redistribution
Full Redistribution
Figure 3: IRFs Interest rate shock - Constant taxes
optimally adjust prices, the improvement in borrowersconsumption en-
suing from the public expenditure shock generates an increase in labor
demand. The rise in real wage that results from the expansion in labor
demand generates, for one, a further income e¤ect on borrowers and fur-
ther expansion in their consumption; it also results in a fall in prots,
and in a fall of public debt due to higher public revenues.
Consider now the case of a interest rate shock. Figure (3) presents
the impulse responses of our key variables to a negative interest rate
shock. We x the size of the shocks to 0.01. In response to a negative
interest rate shock, the impulse responses of the economies starting
at three di¤erent initial conditions are similar but vary with the size
of the gap between the levels of taxes. Savers choose to work more
because of the substitution e¤ect between labor and nancial activities
incomes, leading to an overall expansion in spending and output. On the
other side the negative interest rate shock will call for an higher level of
consumption for both, savers and borrowers. And, because of an income
e¤ect, borrowerslabor supply will decrease. As rms cannot optimally
adjust prices, the expansion in consumption ensuing from the interest
rate shock generates an increase in labor demand. The increase in the
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Figure 4: IRFs Saver tax shock - Constant taxes
real wage that results from the expansion in labor demand generates, for
one, a further income e¤ect and hence a further increase in consumption;
it also results in a decrease in prots, with an additional positive income
e¤ect on the savers labor supply. Public debt reduction results from
higher public revenues.
Consider now the case of a saver tax shock. Figure (4)presents the
impulse responses of our key variables to a negative saver tax shock;
the magnitude of the shock is the same as previous shocks. In response
to a negative saver tax shock, savers choose to work less when borrowers
pay taxes, while they choose to work more when borrowers receive a
subsidy. Savers internalize the government budget constraint through
their public debt holdings and so recognize that a lower saver tax today
implies a tax on themselves, today or in the future. On the other side,
borrowers choose to work more but the intensity of the income e¤ect
on labor supply varies with the size of the gap between the levels of
taxes. Hence, when taxes are uniform, the income e¤ect on borrowers
labor supply prevails over the income e¤ect on savers labors supply,
leading to an overall expansion in spending, output, and consequently
in labor demand. But, in this particular case, the expansion is not big
20
enough to generate a rise in real wage and higher nominal interest rates
along the adjustment path. Lower real wages generate a further income
e¤ect on borrowers and further reduction in their consumption; it also
results in an increase of prots, and in an increase of public debt due
to lower public revenues. When there is a redistribution but borrowers
continue to pay a tax, the income e¤ect on saverslabor supply prevails
over the income e¤ect on borrowerslabor supply, leading to an overall
contraction in spending, output, and consequently in labor demand. An
interest rate rule that satises the Taylor principle will generate lower
nominal interest rates along the adjustment path. The reduction in real
wage that results from the reduction in labor demand generates a further
income e¤ect on borrowers and further reduction in their consumption; it
also results in an increase of prots, and in an increase of public debt due
to lower public revenues. Finally, when there is a positive income e¤ect
on both labor supplies - the case in which savers internalize the budget
constraint - a negative saver tax shock leads to the bigger expansion in
spending, output, and consequently in labor demand. But also in this
case, as in the case of uniform taxes, the expansion is not big enough
to generate a rise in real wage. Lower real wages generate a further
income e¤ect on borrowers and further reduction in their consumption;
it also results in an increase of prots, and in an increase of public debt
due to lower public revenues. The Taylor principle will generate higher
interest rate; however, the increase in interest rate is not so high to call a
lower level of consumption for savers, an income e¤ect prevails over the
common substitution e¤ect in this particular case. While, in the other
ones, lower nominal interest rates will call higher level of consumption
for savers.
Finally, consider the case of a borrower tax shock. Figure (5) presents
the impulse responses of our key variables to a negative borrower tax
shock; the magnitude of the shock is the same as previous shocks. In
response to a negative borrower tax shock, savers labor choose to work
more when borrowers pay a tax, while they choose to work less when
borrowers receive a subsidy. On the other hand, borrowers choose to
work more but the intensity of the income e¤ect on labor supply varies
with the size of the gap between the levels of taxes. Hence, when bor-
rowers pay the labor tax, a negative borrower tax shock leads to the
expansion in spending and output. But an interest rate rule that satis-
es the Taylor principle will generate higher nominal interest rates along
the adjustment path, and hence, will call for a lower level of consumption
for savers. As rms cannot optimally adjust prices, the improvement in
borrowersconsumption ensuing from the borrower tax shock generates
an increase in labor demand. The rise in real wage that results from the
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Figure 5: IRFs Borrower tax shock - Constant taxes
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expansion in labor demand generates, for one, a further income e¤ect
on borrowers and further expansion in their consumption; it also results
in a fall in prots, and in a fall of public debt due to higher public rev-
enues. On the other hand, when borrowers receive a subsidy, a negative
borrower tax shock leads to the contraction in spending and output be-
cause the income e¤ect on saverslabor supply prevails over the income
e¤ect on borrowerslabor supply. But an interest rate rule that satises
the Taylor principle will generate lower nominal interest rates along the
adjustment path, and hence, will call for a higher level of consumption
for savers. As rms cannot optimally adjust prices, the reduction in
consumption ensuing from the borrower tax shock generates a decrease
in labor demand. The reduction in the real wage that results from the
decrease in labor demand generates, for one, a further income e¤ect on
borrowers and hence a further reduction in their consumption; it also
results in a rise in prots, with an additional negative income e¤ect on
the savers labor supply. Public debt increase results from lower public
revenues.
3.3 Competitive Equilibrium with Fiscal Rule
Assume a general nancing scheme whereby taxes on each agent increase
to repay the outstanding debt but only gradually so:
 ;t = 

Bbt   ;t; (43)
where  = b; s; and t is an i.i.d. shock.
This tax rule is general enough to allow taxes on each agent to react
to stabilize government debt (B = 0:09 is the debt feedback coe¢ cient),
and asymmetric changes in taxation for the two agents (;t is a random
innovation). The plan prescribes a tax path that depends on public debt.
We think that this is an interesting case, even though it is a simple one,
because an endogenous tax response to public debt roughly agrees with
the intentions declared by most of public debt-targeting governments.
We keep all our previous assumptions.
3.3.1 Steady State
As in the previous section, we rst set xt = 1 and Gt = 0:15 for all t and
analyze the non-stochastic steady state of the competitive equilibrium
with scal rule as a function of the steady-state ination rate t = 1:
The values of the macroeconomic variables of interest are reported in
the third column of Table(4). In words, public liabilities must be 20% of
GDP, which implies higher hours, output, prots, value of share as well
as aggregate consumption, in particular saversconsumption, relative to
the economy where taxes are constant. Only borrowerconsumption is
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Variable Symbol Fiscal rule
Borrowers consumption Cb 0.8573
Savers consumption Cs 1.4045
Aggregate consumption C 1.2130
Borrowers hours worked Nb 1.1919
Savers hours worked Ns 1.4551
Aggregate worked hours N 1.3630
Taxes  b;  s 0.1345
Real debt b 0.2689
Real market value of shares V 22.4890
Real dividend payo¤s of shares   0.2272
Table 4: Steady State
lower in this economy than in the case in which he receive a subsidy.
3.3.2 Analysis of equilibrium dynamics
Figure (6) presents the impulse responses of our key variables to a pos-
itive technological shock. We x the size of the shock to 0.01. In a
competitive economy with scal rule, both labor supplies decrease, while
in a competitive economy with constant taxes borrower labor supply in-
creases. But in this event the reduction is so small that the shock leads,
in any case, to an overall expansion in spending and output, while in
the previous section we have observed an overall contraction. Hence,
in this particular case, nominal interest rate increases along the adjust-
ment path, according to the Taylor principle. The productivity shock
generates a decrease in labor demand and an increase in real wage. And,
according to the element typical of a sticky-price environment, the in-
crease in the real wage generates, for one, a further income e¤ect on
borrowers and a further improvement in their consumption. However,
in this particular case, the positive technological shock generates not
only a rise in wages, but also in prots, with an additional negative
e¤ect on the savers labor supply. Finally, the increase in wages more
than compensates the reduction on labor supply, leading to an overall
expansion in public revenues, and consequently a reduction in public
debt.
The impulse response to a positive public expenditure shock
are reported in Figure (7); the magnitude of the shock is the same as
in productivity shock. In this scenario, we can observe two important
di¤erences relative to the context with constant taxes:
 both agents choose to work more;
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Figure 6: Fiscal rule with productivity shock
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Figure 7: Fiscal rule with government expenditure shock
 public debt increases.
While it is pretty obvious that, in absence of subsidies, an increase
in government expenditure support labor supplies by both agents, as we
have already seen in the previous section, the second element can be
object of discussion. Public debt increases because, in this particular
case in which taxes depend on public debt, rms internalize the gov-
ernment budget constraint limiting the rise in labor demand and wages,
and consequently generating an increase in public debt.
Consider now the case of a interest rate shock. Figure (8) presents
the impulse responses of our key variables to a negative interest rate
shock. We x the size of the shocks to 0.01. Dynamics of an interest
rate shock in a competitive scenario with scal rule are equal to dynamics
observed for the same shock in a context with constant taxes, as seen in
the previous Section.
Consider now the event of a saver tax shock. Figure (9) presents the
impulse responses of our key variables to a negative saver tax shock;
the magnitude of the shock is the same as previous shocks. In response
to a negative tax shock, savers choose to increase their labor supply
because they internalize the government budget constraint more than
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Figure 8: Fiscal rule with interest rate shock
in the event of constant taxes, and so recognize that a lower saver tax
today implies a tax on themselves in the future. On the other side, as
in the event of constant taxes, borrowers choose to work more, leading
to an overall expansion in spending, output, and consequently in labor
demand. An interest rate rule that satises the Taylor principle will
generate higher nominal interest rates along the adjustment path. The
increase in real wage that results from the expansion in labor demand
generates a further income e¤ect on borrowers and further expansion
in their consumption; it also results in a decrease of prots, and in a
decrease of public debt due to higher public revenues.
Finally, consider the case of a borrower tax shock. Figure (10)
presents the impulse responses of our key variables to a negative bor-
rower tax shock; the magnitude of the shock is the same as previous
shocks. In response to a negative borrower tax shock, savers and bor-
rowers choose to work more, leading to an overall expansion in spending,
output and labor demand. But an interest rate rule that satises the
Taylor principle will generate higher nominal interest rates along the
adjustment path. The rise in real wage that results from the expansion
in labor demand generates, for one, a further income e¤ect on borrowers
and further expansion in their consumption; it also results in a fall in
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Figure 9: Fiscal rule with saver tax shock
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Figure 10: Fiscal rule with borrower tax shock
29
0 5 10 15 20
-2
0
2
Productivity shock
0 5 10 15 20
-0.5
0
0.5
Public expenditure shock
0 5 10 15 20
-0.05
0
0.05
Interest rate shock
0 5 10 15 20
-2
0
2
Saver tax shock
0 5 10 15 20
-2
0
2
Borrower tax shock
Equal taxes
Redistribution
Full Redistribution
Fiscal Rule
Figure 11: IRFs c_ratio
prots, and in a fall of public debt due to higher public revenues.
In the end, we want to compare the equilibrium dynamics concerning
the ratio between borrower consumption and saver consumption (and
their relative wealth) in the four cases shown in detail before:
 no redistribution;
 redistribution;
 full redistribution;
 scal rule.
A positive productivity shock obviously increases savers consumption
more than borrowers one. Figure (11) shows that the e¤ect, when taxes
are constant, is enormously greater than the e¤ect in the presence of the
scal rule. It is not the same in the event of a public expenditure shock.
In any case, a positive public expenditure shock increases borrowers
consumption more than savers consumption in the same amount. In the
event of a negative interest rate shock the IRFs are slightly di¤erent
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but in any case the shock increases borrowers consumption more than
savers one. On the other side, a negative saver tax shock increases savers
consumption more than borrowers one but the e¤ect in the event savers
receive a subsidy is enormously greater than all other cases.
Finally, the IRFs in the event of a negative borrower tax shock are
very di¤erent. In the case borrowers pay taxes and taxes are constant,
and in the presence of a scal rule, a borrower tax shock increases bor-
rowers consumption more than savers one, but the e¤ect in the presence
of the scal rule is enormously greater than the e¤ect when taxes are con-
stant. On the other side, when borrowers receive a subsidy a borrower
tax shock increases savers consumption more than borrowers one.
4 Concluding Remarks
The analysis herein has shown how the interaction between borrowing-
constrained behavior by some households and sticky prices make it pos-
sible generate an increase in consumption in response to scal stimu-
lus programs, in a way consistent with much of the recent evidence.
Borrowing-constrained consumers partly insulate aggregate demand from
the negative wealth e¤ects generated by the higher levels of (current and
future) taxes needed to nance the scal expansion, while making it more
sensitive to current disposable income. Sticky prices make it possible for
real wages to increase. The combined e¤ect of a higher real wage and
higher employment raises current labor income and hence stimulates the
consumption of borrowing-constrained households.
Our theoretical analysis assumes that government spending is -
nanced by means of distortive labor income tax on both agents or by
issuing one-period, risk free, non state contingent nominal bonds, which
are held only by the savers. Allowing for staggered nominal wage set-
ting or some form of real wage rigidity constitutes another potentially
useful extension of our framework, one that is likely to have a signicant
e¤ect on the response of real wages and, hence, of labor income and
consumption to any scal shock (Gali et al., 2007).
This article contributes to a vast literature on the relation between
public debt and redistribution through scal policy, in a model with het-
erogenous agents; see Bilbiie, Monacelli and Perotti (2013) for a survey.
The novel element is that our analysis introduces public expenditure
variable in the utility function of both agents analyzing a scal regime
with distortive taxes on labor income. In this economy, a positive tech-
nological shock leads to an overall contraction in the event of constant
taxes, while it leads to an overall expansion in the presence of the scal
rule. Hence, a positive technological shock generates paradoxical results:
an increase in productivity is contractional. The key extra element is
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that these contradicting forces depend on the share of borrowers. A pos-
itive public expenditure shock and a negative interest rate shock lead to
an overall expansion, in any case. The model suggests not only that
a temporary rise in government spending will not crowd out private
spending, it will lead to increased spending on the part of liquidity-
constrained debtors (Krugman and Eggertsson, 2012). In the analysis
of expansionary scal policy, public debt increases more in a context of
partial redistribution in steady state than in a context of full redistribu-
tion, due to the internalization of government budget constraint by the
fraction of households which holds public bonds. In addition, a negative
saver tax shock has a negative impact on redistribution, but this e¤ect
is exacerbated by the presence of partial redistribution in steady state.
Finally, a negative borrower tax shock has a negative impact on redistri-
bution when borrowers receive subsidies in steady state, because savers
are completely discouraged to save.
In the paper we constructed a model of dynamic economy that, at
the aggregate level, is deterministic; and we then hit the economy with
an unexpected temporary shock. Although this approach succeeds in
keeping the analysis tractable, it skirts around some central issues. The
key question is, To what extent can contingent debt contracts be writ-
ten? There are a number of explanations for why it may be impossible
to condition debt repayments on idiosyncratic shock. However, it is less
clear why the terms of a contract cannot be made sensitive to aggregate
events. This is a di¢ cult matter to resolve.
Let us turn to less thorny issues. A weakness of our model is that
it provides no analysis of who becomes credit constrained, and when.
we merely rely on the assumption that di¤erent agents have di¤erent
discount factors and preferences for leisure (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997).
We conclude by describing several areas where future research would
quite useful. Firstly, it is always the case that more knowledge of the way
the macroeconomic works can improve the performance of coordination
between scal and monetary policy. Particularly critical, however, is a
better understanding of the determinants of inequality. Secondly, our
analysis of coordination, as in much of the literature, was restricted to
closed economy frameworks. Extensions to open economy frameworks
are likely to provide new insights on the desirability of alternative kinds
of coordination between scal and monetary rules, and raise a number of
issues of great interest, including: the choice of exchange rate regime, the
potential benets from monetary and scal coordination among di¤erent
countries, the optimal response to shocks originating abroad. Finally,
one would want to consider some of the normative implications of our
framework. In a model with two types of consumers considered herein,
32
the monetary and scal policy responses to shocks of di¤erent nature can
be expected to have distributional e¤ects, which should be taken into
account in the design of those policies. Exploring the implications of the
present model for optimal monetary and scal policy design constitutes
an additional interesting avenue for future research (Clarida, Galì and
Gertler, 1999).
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A Appendix
We have seen that a positive technological shock generates paradoxical
results: an increase in productivity is contractional. The key extra ele-
ment is that these contradicting forces depend on the share of borrowers.
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Variable Symbol No Red. Red. Full Red.
Borrowers consumption Cb 0.7828 0.85 1.5735
Savers consumption Cs 1.2273 1.0109 0.9471
Aggregate consumption C 1.1384 0.9787 1.0723
Borrowers hours worked Nb 1.0556 0.9722 1.1254
Savers hours worked Ns 1.3466 1.1678 1.2466
Aggregate worked hours N 1.2884 1.1287 1.2223
Real debt b 17.0388 28.501 17.0017
Real market value of shares V 21.2592 18.6238 20.1685
Real dividend payo¤s of shares   0.2147 0.1881 0.2037
Table 5: Steady State - Lower Borrower share
Assume a lower share of impatient households  than we have assumed
before. We set the parameter equal to 0.2. We keep all our previous
assumptions. In Table (5), we can observe that public liabilities must
be higher than in Table(3). And, Figure (12) shows that the increase on
consumption by the savers more than compensates the reduction on con-
sumption by the borrowers, leading to an overall expansion in output,
and conrming standard results.
34
0 10 20
-2
0
2
Cb
0 10 20
0
0.5
1
Cs
0 10 20
-2
0
2
N
0 10 20
-1
0
1
Nb
0 10 20
-2
0
2
Ns
0 10 20
-1
0
1
Y
0 10 20
-0.01
0
0.01
Interest rate
0 10 20
0
10
20
Profits
0 10 20
-2
0
2
Inflation
0 10 20
0
0.5
1
b
0 10 20
-2
0
2
w
Equal taxes
Redistribution
Full Redistribution
Figure 12: IRFs Productivity shock - Lower Borrower Share
35
Money-Financed versus Debt Financed Fiscal
Stimulus with Borrowing Constraints
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Abstract
We consider a NK-DSGE model with distortive taxation and hetero-
geneous agents, modeled using a modied version of the mechanism pro-
posed by Bilbiie, Monacelli and Perotti (2012). Following Galì (2014),
we study the e¤ects of a shock to government purchases under two al-
ternative nancing regimes: (i) monetary nancing; (ii) debt nancing.
Particularly, we focus on the redistributive e¤ects of the two regimes and
we nd the following. Both regimes imply a redistributive e¤ect from
savers to borrowers, measured in terms of the ratio between the consump-
tion of borrowers and that of savers. The redistribution is much greater in
the money-nanced scal stimulus, where the consumption ratio is more
than three times higher than the implied one in the debt-nanced scal
stimulus. Borrowers are better o¤ also in terms of their relative labor sup-
ply. Finally, with respect to the representative agent model, the presence
of borrowers enhances the impact of the scal intervention on aggregate
output, when spending is debt nanced. Remarkably, with respect to Galì
(2014) the same regime implies a reduction of the debt burden instead of
an increase.
1 Introduction
This paper contributes to the literature of money-nanced scal stimulus. This
literature has concentrated on the comparison between the Classical and the
New Keynesian framework (Galì (2014)), particularly focusing on the e¤ects
of a shock to government purchases nanced entirely through seigniorage or
more conventionally through public debt. However, it abstracts from the role
played by borrowing constraints. Furthermore, as for most of the papers with
scal stimula, it considers lump-sum taxes and do not analyze the interaction
between distortive taxes and scal stimula. This paper tries to ll this gap, by
considering a New-Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model -
Chiara Punzo (University of Milan) and Lorenza Rossi (University of Pavia).
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henceforth, NK-DSGE model - characterized by distortive taxation and hetero-
geneous agents. In this respect, the economies are characterized by the pres-
ence of savers and borrowers that interact in the credit market. Borrowers and
savers are modeled using a modied version of the mechanism proposed by Bil-
biie, Monacelli and Perotti (2013 - BMP henceforth). They indeed di¤er in
their degree of impatience: both agents are intertemporal maximizers - since
borrowing and lending take place in equilibrium; and, nancial markets are im-
perfect. Di¤erently from them, we introduce real balances in the utility function
of both agents, and the budget constraints are also characterized by real money
holdings, together with distortive taxes on labor income of both agents. In
particular, as in BMP, we assume that the labor income tax follows a simple
feedback rule that reacts to stabilize government debt. In this context, we study
the dynamics of the model in response to an exogenous increase in government
purchases under two alternative nancing regimes: (i) monetary nancing and
(ii) debt nancing, with the central banks decision bound by an interest rate
rule in the latter case. The main results of the paper can be summarized as
follows.
A key nding from our analysis lies on the redistributive e¤ect of a money-
nanced scal stimulus. The redistributive e¤ect is measured in terms of the
ratio between borrower and saver consumption. We show that, in the money-
nanced scal stimulus the consumption ratio is more than three times higher
than that implied by the debt-nancing regime. Borrowers are also better o¤ in
terms of their relative labor supply. Indeed, the money-nanced scal stimulus
implies that borrowers supply less labor than savers.
The intuition for these ndings is the following. As in Galì (2014), a govern-
ment spending shock, nanced through money, implies a consumption crowding
in, followed by an high and persistent increase in ination, which is responsible
for a long lasting decline in the real debt ratio owned by savers. The increase in
consumption and that of ination is then followed by an increase in the money
demand, which leads to an increase in the nominal interest rate. Furthermore,
di¤erently from Gali (2014), the reduction in the real public debt implies lower
income tax rates for both types of households, due to the scal rule considered.
This reduces government revenues and partially counteracts the initial reduction
of the debt. Both lower revenues and higher interest rates imply an higher debt
burden, which is immediately internalized by savers. They indeed fear that an
increase in the debt would be followed by an increase in their labor income tax
and thus, ceteris paribus, they decide to consume less than borrowers, which do
not own any debt and, by construction, cannot internalize the negative e¤ect of
the debt.
Another key nding turns out when we compare our model characterized by
distortive labor income tax rules with the same model with lump-sum taxes.
Remarkably, in the distortive labor income tax model, we nd that the debt
nanced regime implies a reduction in the public debt owned by savers and
thus, a reduction in the government debt burden instead of the increase found
in Galì (2014). As will be clear in the paper, this counterintuitive result is
due to the presence of a distortive labor income tax rule, while households
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heterogeneity plays no role in determining the debt reduction. Indeed, with
a distortive labor income tax rule, savers internalize the government budget
constraint, and recognize that an increase in public expenditure today e¤ectively
implies an increase in the debt and thus in their labor income tax, today and
in the future. To avoid this, they sell their holdings of government debt to the
central bank. In doing this, they reduce their debt beyond the newly issued
debt required to nance the scal stimulus.
Finally, we nd that when the government spending shock is debt-nanced
and taxes are distortive, the behavior of aggregate variables presents an impor-
tant departure from that of the representative agent model. In particular, we
show that the presence of borrowers enhances the impact of the scal interven-
tion on aggregate output, when spending is nanced through debt. Furthermore,
we nd that the reduction in the debt burden is stronger in the two agents model
with distortive taxes than in the same model with a representative agent. The
extra-reduction in the debt burden, characterizing the model with borrowing
constraints, can be explained as follows. Since in our model savers are the
single private owners of public debt, ceteris paribus, their percapita internal-
ization of the debt, and consequently the amount of debt sold to the central
bank, is higher than in a representative agent economy. This implies a lower
debt burden, bringing about lower nominal and real interest rates, which leads
to an increase in savers consumption higher than in the single agent economy.
Because of the higher increase in the aggregate demand, output increases more
than in a representative agent model.
In the recent years, many authors concentrated on the issue of consumers
heterogeneity due to the limited asset market participation. They show that the
presence of liquidity constrained consumers alters the standard results on the
dynamics of the NK-DSGE model. For example, Galì et al. (2007) demonstrate
that the presence of liquidity constrained consumers can explain consumption
crowding in, which follows an increase in government spending. Bilbiie (2008)
shows that limited asset market participation can lead to an inverted aggregate
demand logic (the IS curve has a positive slope). Di Bartolomeo and Rossi
(2007) show that the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy increases as limited asset
market participation becomes more important. Galì et al. (2004) study the
determinacy properties in a model with limited asset market participation and
capital accumulation under di¤erent Taylor rules, showing that the presence
of liquidity constrained consumers may alter the determinacy properties of a
standard NK model. However, none of these papers compare a money-nanced
scal stimulus with a debt-nanced scal stimulus. Also they do not consider
the dynamic e¤ects of scal rules in the presence of public debt and borrowing-
constrained agents. One exception is represented by BMP which analyze the
e¤ects of two types of scal policy rules in a model where a fraction of households
are borrowing-constrained. However, this paper does not investigate the role
played by distortive labor income tax rules, and does not analyze the e¤ects of
a government spending nanced through seigniorage.
The academic literature has reacted with a renewed interest in monetary and
scal policy interactions (See Woodford (2011) and Kirsanova et al. (2009)).
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Ascari and Rankin (2013) have analyzed the potentially drastic e¤ect of a Tay-
lor Rule on the e¤ectiveness of scal policy in a non-Ricardian model with
overlapping generations. However, they do not analyze the e¤ects of distortive
labor income taxes and they do not consider monetary policies alternative to
the standard Taylor-type rules. Galì (2014) has instead analyzed the e¤ects of
an alternative and not conventional monetary policy to recover the economy: a
scal stimulus, in the form of temporary increase in government purchases, -
nanced entirely through money creation. However, Galì (2014) does not consider
the redistributive e¤ects of this policy which is instead the main objective of
our paper. Finally, this literature considers lump-sum taxes and the distortive
e¤ect of the labor income tax rules is not taken into account.
Money creation to nance the government debt has always been associated
with the fears of high ination and no role was expected by scal policies. Also
because of the beliefs that the lags in implementing scal policies were typically
too long to be useful to recover from recessions. However, this long period of
crisis has opened a wide spectrum of policy tools, above all because interest rates
are already close to zero bound. Nowadays, many money creation policies are
considered. The extreme end of this spectrum of possible tools is represented by
the over money nance of scal decit - "helicopter money", that is a permanent
monetization of government debt (Turner 2013). However, a more moderate
example of money creation has already been implemented by central banks: as
for example quantitative easing operations. The latter has been accompanied
by expansive scal policies at least in the US. On this last issue, Giavazzi and
Tabellini (2014) argue that measures as quantitative easing should always take
place together with scal easing. Our paper goes in this direction by considering
a more structured scal policy than the one considered by Gali (2014) and by
also investigating the redistributive e¤ects of money nanced spending policies.
As we show in the paper the redistributive e¤ects of these policies seem to be
important and cannot be neglected by policy makers. Also we point out that
when labor income taxes follow a feedback rule, as the one considered in our
model, a debt nancing scal rule is not necessarily so detrimental for the scal
authority since when the central bank is allowed to buy in the secondary market,
private households (consumers or even banks in a more sophisticated nancial
markets) have the incentive to sell their debt to the monetary policy authority.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 spells out the
model economy, while Section 3 analyzes the e¤ect of a money-nanced scal
stimulus in a NK-DSGE model with savers and borrowers. It then compares the
results with those obtained under a debt-nancing regime, and then it compares
our results with the ones implied by a representative agent model. Section 4
summarizes the main ndings and concludes.
2 The model
The model considered is a closed economy composed by four agents: households,
rms, the scal authority and the monetary authority.
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2.1 Households
All households have preferences dened over private consumption, C;t; real
balances, M;t=Pt, and labor services, N;t, according to the following utility
function:
U0 = E0
1X
t=0
t
"
(1  ) lnC;t +  ln M;t
Pt
   
N1+';t
1 + '
#
; (1)
where ' is the inverse of the labour supply elasticity. Following BMP, the
agents di¤er in their discount factors  2 (0; 1) and possibly in their preference
for leisure  : Specically, there are two types of agents  = s; b, and s > b:
E0 denotes expectations conditional on the information available at time 0 and
 measures the weight of real balances relatively to private consumption. Also,
 determines the share of real balances over GDP.
C;t is a CES aggregator of the quantity consumed Ct (z) of any of the
innitely many varieties z 2 [0; 1] and it is dened as
C;t =
Z 1
0
Ct (z)
 1
 dz
 
 1
; (2)
 > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between varieties.
A 1    share is represented by households who are patient: we label them
savers, discounting the future at s: Consistent with the equilibrium outcome
the patient agents are savers (and hence will hold the bonds issued by impatient
agents), we impose that patient agents also hold all the shares in rms. Hence,
they have access to three di¤erent assets: money, one-period nominally riskless
bonds and shareholdings. In each period t  0 and under all contingencies each
saver chooses consumption, hours worked, money demand asset holdings (bonds
and shares), subject to:
PtCs;t +B
H
s;t + PtAs;t +Ms;t + 
s;tPtVt  (1 + it 1)BHs;t 1 + (1 + it 1)PtAs;t
Ms;t 1 + 
s;t 1Pt (Vt 1 +  t)
+WtNs;t(1  s;t); (3)
where Wt is the nominal wage, As;t 1 is the real value at beginning of pe-
riod t of total private assets held in period t, a portfolio of one-period bonds
issued in t  1 on which the household receives the nominal interest it 1: Vt 1is
the real market value at time t of shares in intermediate good rms,  t are
real dividend payo¤s of these shares, 
s;t are share holdings, wtNs;t (1  s;t) is
the after-tax real saver labor income, BHs;t are the saversholdings of nominally
riskless one-period government bonds (paying an interest it). The nominal debt
BHt pays one unit in nominal terms in period t+1. To prevent Ponzi games, the
following condition is assumed to hold at all dates and under all contingencies
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limT!1Et
(
TY
k=0
(1 + it+k)
 1
BHs;t+T
)
 0: Given prices, policies and trans-
fers fPt (z) ;Wt; it; Gt; s;t; Vt; t; Ttgt0 ; the saver chooses the set of processes
Cs;t (z) ; Cs;t; Ns;t;Ms;t; As;t; B
H
s;t;
s;t
	
t0 ;so as to maximize (1) subject to
(2) ; (3) and no-Ponzi game condition. After dening the aggregate price level
as Pt =
hR 1
0
Pt (z)
1 
dz
i 1
1 
;
as well as real debt as, bHt  Bt=Pt;optimality is characterized by the rst-
order conditions:
sEt

Cs;t (1 + it)
Cs;t+1t+1

= 1; (4)
sEt

Cs;t
Cs;t+1
Vt+1 +  t+1
Vt

= 1; (5)
 sNs;tCs;t
1   = wt (1  s;t) ; (6)
Ms;t
Pt
=


1  

Cs;t

1 +
1
it

: (7)
Equation (6) shows that the labor income tax drives a wedge between the
marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption and the real
wage.
In each period t  0 and under all contingencies the rest of households on
the [0; ] interval are impatient (and will borrow in equilibrium, hence we index
them by b for borrowers) faces the following budget constraint:
PtCb;t + PtAb;t +Mb;t  (1 + it 1)PtAb;t 1 +Mb;t 1 +WtNt (1   b;t) ; (8)
as well as the additional borrowing constraint (on borrowing in real terms)
at all times t:
 Ab;t  D; (9)
Given prices, policies and transfers fPt (z) ;Wt; t; it; Gt;  b;t; Ttgt0, the
borrower chooses the set of processes fCb;t (z) ; Cb;t; Nb;t;Mb;t; Ab;tgt0 ; so as
to maximize (1) subject to (2) and (8) : Optimality is characterized by the rst-
order conditions:
C 1b;t = bEt

1 + it
t+1
C 1b;t+1

+ t; (10)
 bN
'
b;tCb;t
1   = wt (1   b;t) ; (11)
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Mb;t
Pt
=


1  

Cb;t

1 +
1
it

: (12)
Equation (11) shows that the labor income tax drives a wedge between the
marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption and the real
wage. While, in (10), t takes a positive value whenever the constraint is bind-
ing. Indeed, because of BMP assumptions on the relative size of the discount
factors, the borrowing constraint will bind in steady state.
2.2 Firms
The economy is characterized by an innite number rms indexed by z on the
unit interval [0; 1] : Each rm produces a di¤erentiated variety with a constant
return to scale technology,
Yt (z) = Nt (z) ; (13)
where Nt (z) denotes the quantity of labor hired by rm z in period t. Fol-
lowing Rotemberg (1982), we assume that rms face quadratic price adjustment
costs 2

Pt(z)
Pt 1(z)
  1
2
expressed in the units of the consumption good dened
in (2) and   0: Nominal prots read as:
Et
( 1X
i=0
Qt;t+i (z)
"
Pt+i (z)Yt+i (z) Wt+iNt+i (z)
 Pt+i 2

Pt+i(z)
Pt+i 1(z)
  1
 #)
; (14)
where Qt;t+i is the discount factor in period t for nominal prots i periods
ahead.
Assuming that rms discount at the same rate as savers implies Qt;t+i =
is
Cs;t
Cs;t+it+i
; each rm faces the following demand function:
Yt (z) =

Pt (z)
Pt
 
Y dt ; (15)
where Y dt is aggregate demand and it is taken as given by any rm z. Cost
minimization taking the wage as given implied that real marginal cost is wt.
Firms choose processes fPt (z) ; Nt (z) ; Yt (z)gt0 so as to maximize (14) subject
to (13) and (15), taking as aggregate prices and quantities

Pt;Wt; Y
d
t
	
t0 : Let
the real marginal cost be denoted by
mct = wt (16)
Then, at a symmetric equilibrium where Pt (z) = Pt for all z 2 [0; 1], prot
maximization and the denition of the discount factor imply:
t (t   1) = Et

Cs;t
Cs;t+1
t+1 (t+1   1)

+
Nt


mct     1


(17)
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(17) is the standard Phillips curve according to which current ination de-
pends positively on future ination and current marginal cost. The aggregate
real prots are:
 t = (1 mct)Yt   
2
(t   1)2 : (18)
2.3 Fiscal Authority and Monetary Authority
We start by introducing the budget constraints of the scal and the monetary
authorities, we then describe formally the scal intervention that is the focus of
our analysis.
The scal authority provides the public good Gt (z) for any z 2 [0; 1] and
aggregating them according to:
Gt =
Z 1
0
Gt (z)
 1
 dz
 
 1
; (19)
so that total government expenditures in nominal terms is PtGt and the
public demand of any variety is:
Gt (z) =

Pt (z)
Pt
 
Gt: (20)
Expenditures are nanced by levying a distortive tax or by issuing one pe-
riod, risk-free, non state contingent nominal bonds. Hence, the scal authoritys
period budget constraint is given by
PtGt +Bt 1 (1 + it 1) = (1  ) s;tWtNs;t +  b;tWtNb;t + PtSGt +Bt; (21)
where Gt and  ;t denote government purchases and distortive taxes (in real
terms), Bt is the stock of one-period nominally riskless government debt issued
in period t and yielding a nominal return it; and SGt denotes a real transfer
from the central bank to the scal authority. Equivalently, and after letting
bt = Bt=Pt we can write:
Gt + bt 1
(1 + it 1)
t
= (1  ) s;twtNs;t +  b;twtNb;t + SGt + bt: (22)
The central banks budget constraint is given by
BMt + PtS
G
t = B
M
t 1 (1 + it 1) + Mt;
where BMt denotes the central banks holdings of government debt at the
end of period t, and Mt is the quantity of money in circulation1 . Equivalently,
in real terms
1The balance sheet of the central bank is given by
BMt =Mt
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bMt + S
G
t = b
M
t 1
(1 + it 1)
t
+
Mt
Pt
; (23)
where bMt  BMt =Pt and MtPt is the amount of seigniorage generated in
period t.
The amount of government debt held by households (expressed in real terms),
and denoted by bHt  BHt =Pt, is given by
bHt = bt   bMt (24)
In what follows we often refer to bHt as net government debt, for short.
Combining (22) ; (23) and (24) one can derive the governments consolidated
budget constraint
Gt + b
H
t 1
(1 + it 1)
t
= (1  ) s;twtNs;t +  b;twtNb;t + bHt +
Mt
Pt
(25)
which may also be interpreted as a di¤erence equation describing the evolu-
tion of net government debt over time. Below, following Galì (2014), we consider
equilibria near a steady state with zero ination, no trend growth, and constant
government debt bH , government purchases G, and taxes  2 . On the other
hand, constancy of real balances requires that M = 0 in the steady state. It
follows from (25) that
 b =
G+ ibH   (1  ) swNs
wNb
; (26)
and
s =
G+ ibH    bwNb
(1  )wNs : (27)
Note that (23)implies
SG = ibM ; (28)
i.e. in that steady state the central banks transfer to the scal authority
equals the interest revenue generated by its holdings of government debt. Note
that in a neighborhood of the zero ination steady state, the level of seigniorage
(expressed as a fraction of steady state output) can be approximated as

Mt
Pt

1
Y

=

Mt
Mt 1

Mt 1
Pt 1

Pt 1
Pt

1
Y

=

1
V

mt (29)
2The constancy of the net government debt in the steady state implicitly assumes a tax
rule designed to stabilize that variable about some target bH
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where mt = logMt and V  PYM is the steady state income velocity of
money. In words, the level of seigniorage is proportional to money growth.
Let b^Ht  (
bHt  bH)
Y ; g^t =
(Gt G)
Y and ^ ;t  (;t )Y denote, respectively,
deviations of net government debt, government purchases and taxes from their
steady state values, expressed as a fraction of output. We assume that the scal
authority implements the following feedback rule
^ ;t = B b^
H
t : (30)
This tax rule is general enough to allow taxes on each agent to react to
stabilize government debt (B = 0:09 is the debt feedback coe¢ cient). The
plan prescribes a tax path that depends on public debt. We think that this is
an interesting case, even though it is a simple one, because an endogenous tax
response to public debt roughly agrees with the intentions declared by most of
public debt-targeting governments.
2.4 Money-Financed vs. Debt-Financed Fiscal Stimulus
In "normal" times government purchases are assumed to be constant and equal
to G. The objective of the analysis below is to determine the consequences
of deviations of government purchases from that "normal" level, i.e. G^t =
Gt G:We refer to those deviations as "scal stimulus" (or "scal contraction",
if negative). Below we assume that such scal stimulus, expressed as a fraction of
steady state output and denoted by g^t  (Gt G)Y , follows the exogenous process
g^t = g g^t 1 + "
g
t ; (31)
where g 2 [0; 1) indexes the "persistence" of the scal intervention. The
baseline policy experiment analyzed below consists of an increase in government
purchases nanced entirely through seigniorage. Formally,
Mt
Pt
= G^t; (32)
or, equivalently, using (29),
mt = V g^t; (33)
i.e., the growth rate of the money supply is proportional to the scal stim-
ulus, inheriting the latters exogeneity. Note that whether the central bank
transfer to the scal authority takes the form of a direct transfer of seigniorage
(with no counterpart) or a permanent increase in the central banks holdings
of government debt has no bearing on the macroeconomic e¤ects of the scal
stimulus and is only relevant from an accounting viewpoint.
As an alternative to the scal-monetary regime described above, and with
the purpose of having a comparison benchmark, we also analyze the e¤ects of
a debt-nanced scal stimulus in a (more conventional) environment in which
the central bank follows a simple interest rate rule given by
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{^t = ^t; (34)
where {^t = log iti ; ^t = log
t
 and  > 1 determines the strength of the
central banks response of ination deviations from the zero long-term target.
Notice that, in contrast with the money-nancing regime, mt is no longer
determined by g^t:The interest rate rule requires that the central bank injects
or withdraws money from circulation by means of open market operations (in
exchange for government debt) in order to accommodate whatever money is
demanded by households at the targeted interest rate.
As discussed below, an interest rate rule like (34) gives the central bank a
tight control over ination in response to a scal stimulus, through its choice of
coe¢ cient :Yet, that tighter control comes at the price of a smaller impact of
the scal stimulus on economic activity (i.e. a smaller "scal multiplier").
2.5 Equilibrium
The equilibrium allocation Yt = Ct + Gt + 2 (t   1)2 is based on additional
markets clearing conditions,
Ct = Cb;t + (1  )Cs;t; (35)
Mt = Mb;t + (1  )Ms;t; (36)
Nt = Nb;t + (1  )Ns;t; (37)
respectively, aggregate consumption, money market clearing condition and
labor market clearing condition.
3 Model Dynamics
3.1 Calibration
Before we start showing our results, we briey describe the baseline calibration
of the models parameters. That calibration is summarized in the top panel of
Table (1) : We assume the following settings for the household related parame-
ters: discount factors of borrowers and savers are set respectively b = 0:95 and
s = 0:99, values which are in line to those of BMP. Analogously, as in BMP,
we set the borrowing constraint D = 0:05, borrower and saver preferences for
leisure respectively equal to  b = 0:6 and  s = 0:3. Parameter ; denoting the
share of impatient agents, is set to 0.35, as in BMP, while the debt feedback
coe¢ cient in the labor income rule is set to B = 0:1:
The remaining parameters are kept at their baseline values. We assume that
government purchases account for a fraction  of output in the steady state,
i.e. G=Y = : We calibrate the curvature of labor disutility ' = 5 as in Galì
(2014) so as we calibrate the government spending share  = 0:2 (steady state
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Description Value
NK Model
' Curvature of labor disutility 5
b Borrowers discount factor 0.95
s Savers discount factor 0.99
D Borrowing Constraint 0.05
 b Borrowers preference for leisure 0.6
 s Savers preference for leisure 0.3
 Ination 1
 Weight of money in utility function 0.08
V Velocity (quarterly) 4
 Government spending share 1/5
g Fiscal stimulus persistence 0.9
b^H Steady state debt ratio (quarterly) 2.4
 Taylor rule coe¢ cient 1.5
 Elasticity of substitution (goods) 6
 Index of price rigidities 0.65
B Debt feedback coe¢ cient 0.1
Table 1: Baseline Calibration
share of government purchases in output), the velocity of money V = 4, the
steady state debt ratio bH = 2:4;and that of ination  = 1: The elasticity of
substitution among goods is  = 6 and the Taylor rule coe¢ cient is equal to 1.5.
The persistence of the government spending shock is set to g = 0:9 and the
Calvo price stickiness coe¢ cient used to calibrate the Rotemberg adjustment
cost is set to  = 0:65; which is in the range of values used in calibration of
aggregate sticky price models with exogenous staggering and also consistent
with most of the Bayesian estimation of this parameters.
3.2 The E¤ects of a Money-Financed Fiscal Stimulus
Next we show the impulse response functions (IRFs) of the two-agents model, in
face of a government spending shock entirely nanced through money creation.
Figures 1 and 2 display selected IRFs to a one percent money-nanced scal
stimulus. The dynamics can be described as follows. In particular, Figure 1
shows that the e¤ects of the money-nanced scal stimulus on ination are
very large (20 percent on impact). They are, however, extremely short-lived,
and concentrated in the rst quarter. The increase of consumption (almost 20
percent on impact) contrasts with the crowding out of that variable observed in
the classical models (Galì, 2014). A large expansion of money demand due to
higher prices and consumption brings to an increase in the nominal rate, which
explains the increase in the real interest rate. The gap between the two is, of
course due to a persistently higher rate of ination, resulting from the gradual
adjustment of prices. Gradualism in the price response, implied by staggered
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price setting, thus seems to play a key role in the transmission mechanism of the
money-nanced scal stimulus in the New Keynesian model. Importantly, as in
Galì (2014), the upward response of the nominal interest rate suggests that the
existence of a zero lower bound on that variable (whether currently binding or
not) should not be an impediment to the implementation and success of a scal
intervention of the kind considered here. Further, an unambiguous "positive"
outcome of the intervention considered pertains to the substantial decrease in
the debt ratio (more than 50 percentage points), resulting from erosion of the
real value of government debt outstanding at the time the stimulus is initiated,
due to the high unanticipated ination.
Figure 2 underlines the redistributive e¤ects of the policy. Notice in particu-
lar, that the e¤ects of a money-nanced scal stimulus on borrower consumption
is much greater than the e¤ect on saver consumption. Indeed borrower consump-
tion increases much more than that of savers. Also, borrowers are better o¤ in
terms of their relative labor supply, even if the di¤erence is lower with respect
to the consumption gap between the two agents. Another important di¤erence
concerns the e¤ect of the policy on the agents money demand. Saver money de-
mand declines much more than borrowers money demand. The reason of these
responses depends on the fact that, thanks to the tax rules, savers internalize
the government budget constraint through their public debt holdings and so
recognize that an expansionary monetary and scal policy today e¤ectively im-
plies a tax on themselves, today or in the future, also due to the higher interest
rates. For this reason savers consume less than borrowers and overall the public
debt works as a mechanism to redistribute wealth among agents.
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3.3 Money-Financed vs. Debt-Financed Fiscal Stimulus
Consider next the alternative regime of a debt-nanced scal stimulus, accompa-
nied by a monetary policy described by the simple interest rate Taylor rule (34) :
A central bank that follows a simple rule like (34) can "control", through an
appropriate choice of coe¢ cient  the extent of the inationary impact of the
scal stimulus. In particular, that impact can be made arbitrarily small by hav-
ing the central bank respond to inationary pressures su¢ ciently aggressively,
i.e. by choosing a su¢ ciently large value for : Figure 3 displays the dynamic
responses of several macro variables to the scal stimulus under a debt-nancing
regime when the ination coe¢ cient in rule(34) is  = 1:5. This setting corre-
sponds to the value of the ination coe¢ cient in Taylors (1993) celebrated rule,
and is meant to capture (in a highly stylized way) an empirically plausible pol-
icy response. For the sake of comparability, Figure 3 also displays the dynamic
responses obtained under a monetary-nancing scal stimulus. Because of the
monetary policy rule considered, we label the debt-nancing regime as Taylor.
As shown in Figure 3, the di¤erence in the responses of ination is unam-
biguous: as in Galì (2014), even a moderate ination coe¢ cient of 1.5 is enough
to stabilize ination on impact. The decrease in the debt ratio under a debt
nancing regime is a consequence of distortive taxation, as shown in Appen-
dix. Hence, it leads to a sale of household holdings of government debt in the
short run and, hence, a temporary increase in the size of the corresponding cen-
tral bank holdings above and beyond the newly issued debt required to nance
the scal stimulus. The money supply increases on impact ( more than under
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money-nancing but less persistently), and it leads to a nominal rate decrease
and consequently a real rate decrease. Remarkably, notice that di¤erently from
Galì (2014) even though spending is nanced through debt, the debt owned by
savers reduces on impact as stays below zero for several periods. Even though
the debt reduction is lower than that obtained under a money nanced scal
stimulus. As shown in Figure 4, which compares our baseline model with dis-
tortive tax rule with the same model characterized by lump-sum taxes, this
counterintuitive result is mainly due to the presence of the distortive labor in-
come tax rules.3 Indeed, savers internalize the government budget constraint
through their public debt holdings, and recognize that an increase in public
expenditure today e¤ectively implies an increase in the debt and thus of their
labor income tax, today and in the future. To avoid this, they sell their holdings
of government debt to the central bank, reducing their debt holding beyond the
newly issued debt required to nance the scal stimulus.4
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Figure 3: Fiscal Stimulus in the baseline model
3Figure (B.33) in the appendix shows that the same results hold in the representative agent
model when lump-sum taxes are substituted with the labor income tax rule considered in our
model, which is the same considered in Galì (2014).
4This result does not depend on the persistence of the government spending shock, and
indeed it is robust also for g = 0:5:
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Figure 4: Debt-nanced Fiscal Stimulus in the baseline model:
distorsive vs lump-sum taxes
Finally, notice the impulse responses of the two agents di¤er more in the
case of a money-nanced scal stimulus than in the case of a debt-nancing
regime, as Figure 5 makes clear. In particular, notice that both regimes imply
a redistributive e¤ect from savers to borrowers, measured in terms of the ratio
between the consumption of borrowers and that of savers. The redistribution is
much greater in the money-nanced scal stimulus, where as shown in Figure
6, the consumption ratio is more than three times higher than the implied one
in the debt-nanced scal stimulus. Borrowers are better o¤ also in terms of
their relative labor supply and money demand.
The intuition for these ndings is the following. As in Galì (2014), a govern-
ment spending shock, nanced through money, implies a consumption crowding
in, followed by an high and persistent increase in ination, which is responsible
for a long lasting decline of the debt ratio owned by savers. The increase in
consumption and that of ination is then followed by an increase in the money
demand, which leads to an increase in the nominal interest rate. Furthermore,
di¤erently from Gali (2014), the reduction in the public debt implies lower in-
come tax rates for both types of households, due to the scal rule considered.
This reduces Government revenues and partially counteracts the initial reduc-
tion of the debt. Finally, ceteris paribus, both lower revenues and higher interest
rates imply an higher debt burden, which is immediately internalized by savers
through their public debt holdings. As a consequence, savers consumption in-
creases much less than that of borrowers, which do not own any debt and,
by construction, cannot internalize the negative e¤ect on the government debt
burden.
51
0 5 10 15 20
-50
0
50
Borrower Consumption
0 5 10 15 20
-20
0
20
Saver Consumption
0 5 10 15 20
-20
0
20
Borrower Labor Supply
0 5 10 15 20
-20
0
20
Saver Labor Supply
0 5 10 15 20
-20
0
20
Borrower Money Demand
0 5 10 15 20
-50
0
50
Saver Money Demand
M-finance
Taylor
Figure 5: Fiscal Stimulus in the baseline model: disaggregated e¤ects
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Redistribution
M-finance
Taylor
Figure 6: Consumption Ratio: Money-Financed versus
Debt-Financed Stimuls
Over all, our analysis conrms that the e¤ects of a money-nanced scal
stimulus in a New-Keynesian monetary economy supports a strong case for that
intervention, due to its e¤ectiveness in stimulating output and employment,
despite its large inationary consequences. While its impact on ination is very
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limited, a debt-nanced scal stimulus, accompanied by a simple interest rate
rule has the disadvantage of a null impact on activity. Last but not the least,
private debt results in a reduction instead of an increase.
3.4 Representative vs. Heterogeneous Agents
Some of the key ndings of the previous section regarding the e¤ects of a scal
stimulus under alternative nancing schemes depend likely on the assumption
of heterogeneous agents. The assumption of heterogeneous agents is likely to be
central to the response of real variables to alternative schemes for the nancing
of the scal stimulus (with their implied di¤erences in monetary policy rules). In
the present section we compare our baseline model with the same model with a
representative agent. Taxes are distortive as in our baseline model. This allows
to analyze to what extent our results on the aggregate macro-variables are due
to the presence of borrowing constraints.
3.4.1 Money-Financed Fiscal Stimulus
Next we compare the dynamics of our baseline model with the dynamics of the
representative agent model, in response to a spending shock nanced through
money creation.
Figure 7 displays selected impulse responses to a one percent money-nanced
scal stimulus. As Figure 7 makes clear, the e¤ects of a money-nanced scal
stimulus on output and ination (as well as on most other macro variables)
appear not be a¤ected by the presence of borrowing-constrained households.
In contrast with the representative agent economy, in the two agents model
the scal stimulus requires a sliglthly higher increase in money growth which
explains the corresponding higher increase in the response of nominal interest
rate.
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3.4.2 Money-Financed vs. Debt-Financed Fiscal Stimulus
That invariance, resulting in the money-nanced scal stimulus case, no longer
holds in the case of a debt-nanced scal stimulus, as Figure 8 shows in the
resulting IRFs. Notice that, under a Taylor rule, the presence of borrowing-
constrained consumers enhances the impact of that scal intervention on out-
put due to the increase in overall demand of labor and the increase in overall
consumption (due to the crowding in e¤ect of a scal stimulus on borrower
consumption). Two reasons explain the decrease of public debt held by house-
holds: the decrease of overall public debt due to the rise of overall demand of
labor and a greater internalization of government budget constraint by the sin-
gle owners of public debt, the savers. They increase the sale of their public
debt holdings with respect to the model with representative agent. The extra-
reduction of the debt burden, characterizing the savers-borrowers model, can be
explained as follows. When public spending is nanced through debt and taxes
are distortive, savers internalize the government budget constraint, because of
the fear of higher current and future taxes, and immediately sell their own debt
to the Central Bank. Since in our model savers are the single private owners
of public debt, ceteris paribus, their percapita internalization of the debt, and
consequently the amount of debt sold to the central bank, is higher than in a
representative agent economy. This results in a lower debt burden, accompanied
by an increase in savers consumption which is higher than in the single agent
economy. Because of the higher increase in the aggregate demand, output in-
creases more than in a representative agent model. This also conrms that our
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result on the reduction of the debt ratio does not depend on the introduction
of borrowing constraints but simply on the distortive income tax rule. The ap-
pendix shows that in a lump-sum tax representative agent economy debt owned
by households increases in debt nanced scal rules, as found in Galì (2014).
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Figure 8: Debt-Financed Fiscal Stimulus: two agents vs.
representative agent model
4 Conclusions
In the present paper we consider a NK-DSGEmodel with distortive labor income
tax rules and borrowing constrained agents. We analyze the e¤ects of an increase
in government purchases nanced entirely through seigniorage and compare
them with those resulting from a more conventional debt-nanced stimulus.
A key nding from our analysis lies on the redistributive e¤ects of a money-
nanced scal stimulus. The redistributive e¤ect of the money-nanced scal
stimulus, measured in terms of the ratio between borrower and saver consump-
tion, is much greater than in the debt-nancing regime.
Another key nding turns out when we compare our model with the rep-
resentative agent model, considered by Galì (2014). While the money-nanced
scal stimulus implies important results in terms of redistribution between the
two agents, at aggregate level our model is only slightly di¤erent from the
same model with representative agent. However, when the government spending
shock is debt-nanced, the behavior of aggregate variables presents an impor-
tant departure from the representative agent model. Indeed, in this case, the
presence of borrowing-constrained consumers enhances the impact of the scal
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intervention on aggregate output due to the increase in the aggregate consump-
tion (Galì et al. (2007)). In addition, we observe an higher decrease of the
public debt held by households. Furthermore, we show that the reduction in
the savers debt, following the debt nanced stimulus, is only due to the presence
of distortive labor income tax rules.
Future research e¤orts could embed a deeper welfare analysis, including op-
timal monetary and scal policy, under discretion as well as under commitment.
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A The E¤ect of a Money-Financed Fiscal Stim-
ulus: Lump-sum versus Distortive Taxes
Some of the key ndings of the paper regarding the e¤ects of a scal stimulus un-
der alternative nancing schemes depend likely on the assumption of distortive
taxes. The assumption of distortive taxes is likely to be central to the response
of real variables to alternative schemes for the nancing of the scal stimulus
(with their implied di¤erences in monetary policy rules).
In the present section we relax the assumption of distortive taxes on labor
income underlying the analysis above. More specically, we include lump sum
taxes into the New Keynesian model with monopolistic competition in goods
market and staggered price setting introduced in the paper.
Our objective is to get a sense of the quantitative e¤ects of a money-nanced
scal stimulus on di¤erent macro variables, and their di¤erences with those
obtained under a more conventional debt-nancing scheme, in a model with
lump-sum taxes.
Next we describe the key features of the model. We keep all previous as-
sumptions, except for changes we list. Firms sector remains unchanged.
The Model
Households
The household maximizes utility function subject to a sequence of budget con-
straints
PtCt +B
H
t +Mt = (1 + it 1)B
H
t 1 +Mt 1 +WtNt + Pt t   Pt t; (38)
for t = 0; 1; 2; :::where  t is a lump-sum tax. Hence, the optimality conditions
are given by
Wt
Pt
= CtN
'
t ; (39)
1 = (1 + i)Et

Ct
Ct+1

Pt
Pt+1

; (40)
Mt
Pt
= Ct

1 +
1
it

: (41)
Equation (39) shows that there is no wedge, in the case of lump-sum tax,
between the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption and
the real wage.
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Fiscal and Monetary AuthoritiesBudget Constraints
Expenditures are nanced by levying lump-sum taxes or by issuing one period,
risk-free, non state contingent nominal bonds. Hence, the scal authoritys
period budget constraint is given by
PtGt +Bt 1(1 + it 1) = Pt( t + SGt ) +Bt; (42)
where  t denote lump-sum taxes (in real terms). Equivalently we can write:
Gt + bt 1
(1 + it 1)
t
=  t + S
G
t + bt: (43)
Combining (43) ; (23) and (24) one can derive the governments consolidated
budget constraint with lump-sum taxes
Gt + b
H
t 1
(1 + it 1)
t
=  t + b
H
t +
Mt
Pt
: (44)
Money-Financed Fiscal Stimulus
Next we report the predictions of the New Keynesian model with lump-sum
taxes regarding the e¤ects of a money-nanced scal stimulus identical to the
one analyzed in the paper in the context of a New Keynesian model with dis-
tortive taxes.
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Figure 9: Money Financed Fiscal Stimulus in the representative
agent model
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Figure 9 displays selected impulse responses to a one percent money-nanced
scal stimulus, under the assumption of g = 0:9. The e¤ect on ination, money
growth, nominal and real interest rate is very similar between the lump-sum tax
and the distortive tax context. As Figure 9 makes clear, a substantial di¤erence
between the New Keynesian model with lump-sum tax and the New Keynesian
model with distortive tax lies in the responses of consumption and employment,
and consequently in the responses of output, but also in the response of public
debt. In contrast with the lump-sum tax economy, in the distortive tax model
employment and consumption increase persistently in response to the monetary
injection that accompanies the scal stimulus. That increase induces a large and
persistent expansion of output (almost 15 percent on impact). The debt ratio
declines more fast than in the lump-sum economy. This is due to the increase
of employment (and hence a larger increase of public revenues).
Money-Financed vs. Debt-Financed Fiscal Stimulus
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Figure 10: Fiscal Stimulus in the representative agent with lump-sum
taxes
Figure 10 allows to compare the e¤ects of a money-nanced scal stimulus
to those resulting from a more conventional debt-nanced stimulus combined
with a monetary policy described by a simple interest rate rule. As in the
case of distortive tax, the response of ination to the scal stimulus is much
more muted under debt nancing, since the central bank has its hands free to
counteract the incipient ination with a more restrictive monetary policy. As
shown earlier, a money nanced scal stimulus is much more e¤ective than a
debt-nanced one at stimulating economic activity.
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Figure 11: Debt-nanced Fiscal Stimulus in the representative agent
model
However, if we compare the e¤ects of a debt nanced scal stimulus between
the case of lump-sum taxes and the case of distortive taxes, we notice important
di¤erences. The decrease of debt ratio, in the case of distortive taxation, is
a consequence of the fact that the representative agent internalizes more the
government budget constraint through its public debt holdings due to the tax
on its labor income, and recognizes that an increase in public expenditure today
e¤ectively implies a tax on its labor income, today or in the future. Hence,
it leads to a sale of household holdings of government debt in the short run
and, hence, a temporary increase in the size of the corresponding central bank
holdings above and beyond the newly issued debt required to nance the scal
stimulus. The money supply increases on impact, and it leads to a nominal rate
decrease, and consequently a real rate decrease.
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A Bayesian Estimation of a DSGE Model with
Borrowing-Constrained Agents
Chiara Punzo, Ph.D. Studenty
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Abstract
Using a Bayesian likelihood approach, we estimate a dynamic stochas-
tic general equilibrium model for the US economy using ve macroeco-
nomic time series. The model incorporates monopolistic competition in
goods market, staggered price setting, distortive tax and the presence
of borrowing-constrained agent. We use the estimated New-Keynesian
model to analyze the main driving forces of output developments in United
States. This paper investigates the role of scal policy over the aggregate
US business cycle. Fiscal policies were substantially muted.
Following Smets and Wouters (2007), this paper estimates an extended ver-
sion of a New Keynesian model with monopolistic competition in goods market
, staggered price setting, distortive tax and heterogeneous agents, largely based
on Bilbiie, Monacelli and Perotti (2013) and Galì (2014), on US data covering
the period 1966:1 - 2004:4, and using a Bayesian estimation methodology.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the rst to estimate a DSGE model
with a fraction of Ricardian but borrowing-constrained agents. The stochastic
dynamics are driven by ve shocks: productivity shock, labor supply shock,
mark up shock, preference shock and government expenditure shock. The ob-
jective of the paper is to verify whether the model can explain the main features
of the US macro data: real GDP, hours worked, consumption, real wages and
the short term nominal interest rate. Five shocks allow us to estimate the full
model using the ve data series mentioned above. Bayesian New-Keynesian
models combine a sound, microfounded structure suitable for policy analysis
with a good probabilistic description of the observed data and good forecasting
performance. We use the estimated New-Keynesian model to analyze the main
driving forces of output developments in the United States. We nd that the
productivity and mark-up shocks explain an important part of the volatility
of the main variables, while the most striking result is the irrelevance of scal
shock.
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In the next section, we discuss the linearized dynamic, stochastic, general-
equilibrium (DSGE) model that is subsequently estimated. Then we present
results obtained from the estimation, by showing posterior estimations, posterior
distributions and the Bayesian impulse response functions.
1 The model
The model allows for a fraction of households to face a suitably dened bor-
rowing limit. We conduct our analysis in a framework featuring heterogenous
agents, who di¤er in their degree of impatience, and imperfect nancial markets.
Both agents are intertemporal maximizers - so that borrowing and lending take
place in equilibrium (Bilbiie, Monacelli and Perotti (2013)). We label house-
holds who are patient savers (and hence will hold the bonds issued by impatient
agents); patient agents also hold all the shares in rms. Hence, they have ac-
cess to three di¤erent assets: money, one-period nominally risk less bonds and
shareholdings. The rest of households are impatient: they face a borrowing
constraint. Households supply labor services to monopolistically competitive
producers of goods. At the given wage rate, labor is then supplied on demand
to producers of goods. The monetary policy and scal policy decisions are re-
spectively allocated to the Central Bank and to the Government. The model
features standard nominal frictions, i.e. price stickiness. The technical Appen-
dix provides a full description of the model. In what follows we focus on certain
aspects of the model that are crucial to understand our results, i.e. shocks.
All households have preferences dened over private consumption, C;t, real
balances, Mt=Pt, and labor services, N;t, according to the following utility
function:
U0 = E0
1X
t=0
t
"
(1  ) lnC;t +  ln M;t
Pt
   
N1+';t
1 + '
#
;
where ' is the inverse of labour supply elasticity. We assume that a fraction
1  of households (Savers) will hold the bonds issued by impatient agents, own
rms and trade government bonds. The remaining  households (Borrowers)
face a borrowing constraint. The agents di¤er in their discount factors  2
(0; 1) and possibly in their preference for leisure  : Specically, we assume that
there are two types of agents  = s; b, and s > b: E0 denotes expectations
conditional on the information available at time 0 and  measures the weight of
real balances relatively to private consumption. Also,  determines the relative
weight of real balances in utility.
C;t is a CES aggregator of the quantity consumed Ct (z) of any of innitely
many varieties z 2 [0; 1] and it is dened as C;t =
hR 1
0
Ct (z)
 1
 dz
i 
 1
;  > 1
is the elasticity of substitution between varieties.
The ow budget constraint of savers is
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Figure 1: Model structure
PtCt +B
H
s;t + PtAs;t +Ms;t + 
s;tPtVt  (1 + it 1)BHs;t 1 + (1 + it 1)PtAs;t 1
+Ms;t 1 + 
s;t 1Pt (Vt + Pt) +WtNs;t (1  s;t) ;
whereWt is the nominal wage, As;t 1 is the real value at beginning of period
t of total private assets held in period t, a portfolio of one-period bonds issued
in t   1 on which the household receives the nominal interest rate. Vt 1 is the
real market value at time t of shares in intermediate good rms,  t are real
dividend payo¤s of these shares, 
s;t are share holdings, wtNs;t (1  s;t) is the
after-tax saver real labor income, BHs;t are the saversholdings of nominally risk
less one-period government bonds (paying an interest it). The nominal debt
BHt pays one unit in nominal terms in period t+ 1:
Borrowers face the following budget constraint:
PtCb;t + PtAb;t +Mb;t  (1 + it 1)PtAb;t 1 +Mb;t 1 +WtNb;t (1   b;t)
as well as the additional borrowing constraint (on borrowing in real terms)
at all times t:
 Ab;t  D
Firms z are monopolistically competitive and use as input labor services,
Nt (z) : The production technology is:
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Yt (z) = xtNt (z)
where
x^t = xx^t 1 + "
x
t
x^t evolves as an AR(1) process with an i.i.d Normal innovation term, "xt
which denes a total factor productivity shock.
1.1 Monetary and scal policy rules
Let b^Ht  (
bHt  bH)
Y ; g^t  (Gt G)Y and ^ t  (t )Y denote, respectively, deviations
of net government debt, government purchases and taxes from their steady state
values, expressed as a fraction of output. The Central Bank sets the nominal
interest according to a log-linear Taylor rule:
i
1 + i
{^t = R

i
1 + i

{^t 1 + (1  R)
h
^t + yY^t
i
+ y(Y^t   Y^t 1)
where the hatted variables dene log-deviations from steady state.
We assume a set of log-linear scal rules such that
^ b;t = 
b
B b^
H
t
^s;t = 
s
B b^
H
t
Following Galì (2014), the objective of the analysis below is to determine the
consequences of deviations of government purchases from that "normal" level,
i.e. G^t = Gt   G: We refer to those deviations as "scal stimulus" (or "scal
contraction", if negative). Below we assume that such scal stimulus, expressed
as a fraction of steady state output, follows the exogenous process
g^t = g g^t 1 + "
g
t
1.2 Bayesian estimation
The model presented in the previous section is log-linearized around its steady
state and then estimated with Bayesian estimation techniques. According to
the Bayesian estimation, we choose prior distributions for the parameters and
combine this prior information with the likelihood of the data, following the
Bayes rule, to estimate the mode of the posterior distribution. The software
used for the estimation is Dynare. The posterior distributions of the parame-
ters are obtained through the Metropolis-Hastings Markov chain Monte Carlo
algorithm with a sample of 250,000 draws (dropping the rst 20% draws) and 4
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parallel chains. According to the literature, we set the scale to be used for the
jumping distribution in MH algorithm at 0.2. This option must be tuned ob-
tain, ideally, an acceptance rate of 25%, in order not to reject or accept too often
a candidate parameter. Convergence is assessed by means of the convergence
statistics proposed by Brooks and Gelman (1998).
We use ve key macroeconomic quarterly US time series as observable vari-
ables: the log di¤erence of real GDP, real consumption, the real wage, log
hours worked and the federal funds rate. We include series from the Smets and
Wouters database (2007). The sample period is 1966Q1-2004Q4.
To avoid stochastic singularity, we consider the same number of observables
and shocks. Hence, we include ve structural shocks: technology shock, labor
supply shock, price markup shock, government spending shock and a preferences
shock.
1.3 Calibration and priors
A subset of parameters is calibrated (Table 1). Borrower and saver discount
factors, b and s, are xed respectively at 0.95 and 0.99, values which are in line
to those of Bilbiie, Monacelli and Perotti (2013). The elasticity of substitution
among goods, , is set to 6, in line to that of Galì (2014). The borrowing
constraint, D;is xed at all times t at 0.05, and Borrower and saver preferences
for leisure,  b and  s, are set respectively to 0.6 and 0.3, all in line to BMP.
The relative weight of real balances in utility, , is xed at 0.08. In addition
we assume the following scal policy settings:  = 0:2 (steady state share of
government purchases to output), bH = 2:4 (corresponding to a 60 percent ratio
of debt to annual output). The steady state value of productivity is x = 1 and
the steady state value of ination is  = 1:
The remaining parameters are estimated with Bayesian techniques. A de-
scription of our prior distribution can be found in Table 2. Overall, our priors
are consistent with the literature. When it is not possible to nd references in
the literature or in the data, our priors are relatively uninformative. In partic-
ular, parameters measuring the persistence of the shocks are Beta distributed,
with mean 0.5 and standard deviation 0.2 and the standard errors of the inno-
vations are assumed to follow an Inverse-gamma distribution. The parameters
governing price setting, interest rate smoothing and the steady state fraction
of borrowers are also Beta distributed. The fraction of borrowers  is assumed
to be Beta distributed with mean 0.3 and standard deviation 0.05. The pa-
rameters of the Taylor are Normally distributed. Concerning the parameters
characterizing the scal rules, the prior of feedback parameters is that they are
Normally distributed with mean 0.09 and a standard deviation of 0.251 . It is
important to highlight that we do not impose any restriction on the parameter
dening labor utility, ': We posit that ' is Normally distributed with mean 2
and standard deviation 0.75, thus allowing for the possibility that ' < 1:
1Using a Normal distribution implies that we are not making any assumptions on the signs
of these parameters.
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parameter Description value
b Borrowers discount factor 0.95
s Savers discount factor 0.99
 Elasticity of substitution among goods 6
D Borrowing Constraint 0.05
 b Borrowers preference for leisure 0.6
 s Savers preference for leisure 0.3
 Weight of real balances in utility 0.08
 Ination 1
G
Y Government purchases-to-output SS ratio 0.2
bH
Y Debt-to-output SS ratio 2.4
Table 1: Calibrated parameters
2 Results
In this section we show the results of our estimation. We estimate a model with
ve observable variables and ve shocks: a technology shock, a labor supply
shock, a mark up shock, a preference shock and a government purchases shock.
In Table 2 we present the posterior distributions for the estimation, reporting
the posterior mean and Highest Posterior Density (HPD) intervals. Figures 2,
3, 4 show the prior and posterior distributions of the structural parameters and
shock processes of the model.
The high persistence of the mark up, technology and preferences processes
( = 0:96; x = 0:88 and p = 0:92; respectively) implies, at long horizons,
most of the forecast error variance of the real variables will be explained by
those three shocks. In contrast, the persistence of the public expenditure labor
supply shock is relatively low (g = 0:08 and w = 0:21; respectively). Standard
errors of the shocks show that the technology shock has the highest volatility
("x = 1:14).
Turning to the estimates of the main behavioral parameters, it turns out
that the degree of price stickiness is estimated to be quite a bit lower than
0.75. The average duration of price contracts is about half year. Turning to
the monetary policy reaction function parameters, the mean of the long-run
reaction coe¢ cient to ination is estimated to be relatively high (1.67). There
is a considerable degree of interest rate smoothing, as the mean of the coe¢ cient
on the lagged interest rate is estimated to be 0.75. Policy does not appear to
react very strongly neither to the output gap level nor to changes in the output
gap in the short run, but the value for the coe¢ cient on output is y =  0:0625,
implying a procyclical response by monetary authority to output gap, but not
to changes in the output-gap (y = 0:1). The posterior for the fraction of
borrowers is about 25% (HDP interval: 23%-26%). For the estimated scal
policy parameters, we nd a value for the debt feedback coe¢ cient related to the
scal rule on borrowers labor income bB = 0:62, which is much higher than the
prior mean. But, we nd that the mean of the debt feedback coe¢ cient related
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Prior distribution Posterior distribution
parameters shape mean std dev post. mean 90% HPD interval
g beta 0.500 0.2000 0.0836 0.0145 0.1478
 beta 0.500 0.2000 0.9546 0.9259 0.9841
x beta 0.500 0.2000 0.8767 0.8364 0.9157
p beta 0.500 0.2000 0.9156 0.8678 0.9700
w beta 0.500 0.2000 0.2081 0.0953 0.3196
' norm 2.000 0.7500 0.2746 0.2492 0.2997
bB norm 0.090 0.2500 0.6201 0.5414 0.6964
sB norm 0.090 0.2500 -0.1159 -0.1319 -0.0995
 beta 0.300 0.0500 0.2446 0.2344 0.2592
 norm 1.500 0.7500 1.6663 1.1197 2.1792
y norm 0.100 0.0500 -0.0625 -0.0970 -0.0276
R beta 0.600 0.2000 0.7459 0.5614 0.9560
y norm 0.063 0.0500 0.0956 0.0301 0.1577
 beta 0.750 0.3000 0.5423 0.4491 0.6414
"g invg 0.100 2.0000 0.6540 0.5923 0.7150
" invg 0.100 2.0000 0.8291 0.7439 0.9101
"x invg 0.100 2.0000 1.1383 1.0307 1.2428
"p invg 0.100 2.0000 0.3631 0.2922 0.4306
"w invg 0.100 2.0000 0.8138 0.7157 0.9058
Log data density -827.5
Table 2: Estimated parameters
to the scal rule on savers labor income is negative, sB =  0:13:The inverse
of Frisch elasticity ' has a posterior mean of 0.28. Overall, it appears that the
data are quite informative on the behavioral parameters, as indicated by the
lower variance of the posterior distribution relative to the prior distribution.
2.1 Model dynamics
Table 3 shows an analysis of the variance decomposition which allows us to un-
derstand the importance of each shock in determining the volatility of the main
macro variables. The mark up shock is the most important source of volatility
"g "x " "p "w
Y 1.71 34.30 62.24 0.01 1.74
C 1.03 34.54 62.67 0.01 1.75
i 0.02 10.18 87.57 2.21 0.03
w 0.83 32.10 66.34 0.00 0.73
N 2.42 6.91 88.19 0.02 2.46
Table 3: Variance Decomposition (in percent)
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Figure 2: Prior and Posterior Distributions
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for all variables, being the rst shock in order of importance for employment,
accounting for 88% of its volatility, for the nominal interest rate (88%), for real
wage (66%), for consumption (63%) and output (62%).
Turning to the technology shock, it is worth noticing that it also plays an
important role for the volatility of all variables: consumption (35%), output
(34%), real wage (32%), the nominal interest rate (10%) and employment (7%).
Results from the analysis of the variance decomposition show that the mark
up shock and the technology shock are important drivers of volatility. Since we
are interested in analyzing the dynamics of the estimated model in response to
these two shocks, together with the scal stimulus, we also show the impulse
response functions of the estimated model. 5 shows the Bayesian impulse re-
sponse functions of the model to a positive government purchases shock. As
the public expenditure shock hits the economy, agents - in particular, savers -
internalize the government budget constraint through the scal rules, distortive
taxes on their labor incomes and public debt holdings by savers and so recog-
nize that an increase in public expenditure today e¤ectively implies a tax on
themselves, today or in the future. Hence, as the government purchases shock
hits the economy, on one side employment increases but on the other side house-
holds sell their holdings of government debt in the short run, and it leads to a
temporary increase in the size of the corresponding central bank holdings above
and beyond the newly issued debt required to nance the scal stimulus. The
money supply increases and it leads to a nominal rate decrease. The drop of real
wage is typical element of the sticky-price environment, while the decrease on
impact of overall consumption is mainly explained by the large share of savers
we estimate in our model; as they internalize the government budget constraint
through their public debt holdings, they decrease their consumption, as we can
observe from the overall e¤ect on consumption.
In Figure 6 we present the Bayesian IRFs to a positive shock to mark up.
It leads unambiguously to an overall contraction. The sticky price environment
explains why real wages decrease on impact, bringing down consumption, and
consequently output and employment. The Taylor rule, as monetary authority
response, leads to the decrease of nominal interest rate.
Finally, in Figure 7 we present the Bayesian IRFs to a positive technology
shock. The IRFs of this kind of shock compensate, almost completely, the IRFs
of the mark up shock. In fact, a positive technology shock brings to an overall
expansion in all variables (including the rise in nominal interest rate due to the
Taylor rule), except for employment, which obviously decrease after an increase
of productivity.
2.2 Variance and historical growth decompositions
We conclude our exercise with the analysis of the historical contribution of each
shock to the dynamics of three variables: output, borrowers consumption and
savers consumption.
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Figure 5: Bayes IRFs of the model to the government purchases shock
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Figure 6: Bayes IRFs of the model to the mark up shock
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Figure 7: Bayes IRFs of the model to the technology shock
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Figure 8: Historical decomposition of GDP growth
Table 3 reports the variance decomposition for some key variables. The mark
up and technology shocks cause about 97% of output and consumption volatility.
Shocks to the labor supply account for about 2% of output and consumption
volatility. Preference shocks contribute to 2% of interest rate volatility, but have
no role otherwise. The most striking result is the irrelevance of scal shocks.
The analysis of GDP growth historical decomposition allows to identify the
specic contributions of policy and non-policy shocks over the sample period
(8). It is interesting to compare the main sources of the various recession over
this period. It is quite clear that, at all horizons, productivity and mark-ups are
the most important drivers of GDP. While the recessions of the mid 1990s and
the beginning of the new millennium are driven mainly by technology shocks,
the recessions of 1970s and 1980s are due primarily to positive mark-up shocks
(associated with the oil crisis). The other shocks explain only a minor fraction
of the total variation in GDP.
Figure 9 depicts the historical contribution of the di¤erent types of shocks
to borrowersconsumption over the sample period. It is interesting to notice
that Figure 8 and Figure 9 are very similar, also if the volatility of borrower
consumption is smaller than GDP volatility.
On the contrary, Figure 10 shows a scenario completely di¤erent. The volatil-
ity of the variable is the smallest with respect to output and borrowersconsump-
tion. And recessions of the mid 1880s and the beginning of the new millennium
are driven not only by technology shock but also by a new important driver of
saversconsumption: the preference shock.
However, the most striking result is the irrelevance of scal shock.
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Figure 9: Historical decomposition of borrowersconsumption
Figure 10: Historical decomposition of saversconsumption
74
3 Conclusions
We presented the results of the estimation of the model with heterogeneous
agents and distortive tax. We considered a model hit by di¤erent shocks. Our
results convey a key message: a debt-nanced scal stimulus played no role in
determining the US area business cycle. Another important result is the main
role played by productivity and mark-up shocks, as the most important drivers
of key macroeconomic variables of the model. The preference shock adds to
these two ones in explaining the volatility of saversconsumption.
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A Log-linear model
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